

A View from the Battleground's Periphery: Latinos and the 2004 Elections¹

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Since 1988, more than fifty scholars have contributed to these quadrennial analyses of Latinos and American national elections. These volumes discuss Latino² efforts to shape presidential politics as well as the efforts by political institutions to build Latinos into their winning coalitions (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992; 1996; 1999; 2005). In each, we have struggled with an ongoing dilemma: how to characterize Latino contributions accurately so that we neither perpetuate a rhetoric of inevitable influence nor undervalue the increasing contribution of Latinos to the national political fabric.

The 2004 election continues this dilemma. On the one hand, Latinos proved central – at least early in the campaign – to both parties' strategies for victory. The nominees of each party could make a reasonable claim to loyalty among a significant share of the Latino electorate. Structurally, Latinos had a previously unavailable opportunity to shape the selection of the Democratic nominee. In addition, Latino politics became more national, as outreach and mobilization efforts took place in old as well as new states of Latino residence (see Bejarano and Segura, this volume). On the other hand, Latino votes were, again, not particularly significant to the outcome of the presidential race. As has been true in several recent election cycles, Latino leaders did not invest extensively in mobilizing *new* Latino participants beyond efforts to register new Latino voters. The campaigns followed the pattern of the 2000 race by hiring few Latino campaign staff and assigning most of those they did hire to Latino-focused outreach

responsibilities. Although the Latino vote increased substantially, this increase only mirrors the increase in the Latino adult population (de la Garza and DeSipio 2006).

Our assessment, then, is that 2004 does not substantially change the story of Latino voting that we have long been telling. Incremental growth in Latino voting and Latino influence has not reached a point where Latinos determine national outcomes, except in the most unusual of circumstances. Yet, their presence – and, more importantly, their potential – shapes the national political discussion. It was this potential that created what was a new phenomenon in 2000 that continued in the 2004 race: genuine two party competition for Latino votes nationally. At the state and local levels, Hispanics are increasingly able to use their numbers and organization to form coalitions with other electorates to elect Latinos to office. In 2004, Latino voters were a key coalition player in contests that resulted in the election of two Latinos to the U.S. Senate.

In this chapter and the book that follows, we examine the political consequences of this subtle Latino voice. In this chapter, we begin with a brief discussion of what features of the 2004 campaign were different from those in previous elections. We then offer a narrative of the 2004 campaign to show how Latinos organized and how campaigns and candidates incorporated Latinos and Latino issues into the campaign. We then measure the influence of Latino votes in the 2004 election at the national level and in states with large Latino populations. This discussion of influence assesses why Latinos constitute a smaller share of the electorate than they do of the national population and examines several measures of the impact of Latino votes on the outcome of the 2004 elections.

What Was New in 2004?

As we will show, the 2004 elections did not change the role that Latino voters have

played in national elections over the past twenty years. Instead, the patterns of incremental growth in the Latino electorate and instrumental neglect by political parties, candidates, and institutions continued in 2004. That said, there were several important changes both in the structure of the election, in patterns of Latino participation, and in electoral outcomes that merit comment at the outset so that they do not get lost in the broader narrative of the 2004 campaign. It is these changes that appeared anew in 2004 – or became clearer throughout that campaign than in previous years – that signal a future for Latino politics that is beyond the barrio, or at least beyond the more narrow confines that have characterized it in national campaigns since 1988. Latino politics in 2004 was more national than in previous races. First, it was national in the sense that candidates and campaigns sought Latino votes nationally. Second, and just as importantly, the potential of Latino votes shaped the national discourse about electoral outcomes. Third, Latinos had the opportunity to shape the presidential election not just in November but also in the primaries and in key competitive Senate races in states where Latinos are far from the majority.

In terms of the structure of the election, there were three important changes that do not appear to have affected the 2004 elections, but could do so in the future. A potentially positive change was the shift in the calendar of primaries. Prior to 2004, each party had selected its nominee before large numbers of Latinos voted. Democrats changed this in 2004 with a conscious effort to reach out to Latinos (and more broadly to westerners) by scheduling an early primary in Arizona and an early caucus in New Mexico. More negatively, many states enacted ballot security requirements that increased the likelihood that potential voters would be asked to provide evidence of citizenship. Despite little evidence of non-U.S. citizens voting and considerable evidence that many citizen voters lack the documentation needed to meet these state

standards, states implemented these requirements and Latino leaders reported increased levels of intimidation at the polls. Finally, Latino politics expanded to new destinations. Campaigns in battleground states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania therefore saw Latino outreach as components of state-level campaigns.

As we will demonstrate, Latino voting increased incrementally but at approximately the same rate as seen between other presidential elections (de la Garza and DeSipio 2006). For many analysts, guided by exit polls, the most interesting change in Latino 2004 voting patterns was a shift to higher levels of Republican presidential voting than in prior elections. While we do see a shift to support for President Bush relative to the 2000 election, we are less confident that Bush saw increases at the rates suggested in media accounts.³ We do, however, think there were some interesting changes in Latino voting patterns. To the extent that President Bush did improve his performance among Latinos, the gains appeared among two segments of the Latino electorate – Tejanos and Protestants, particularly evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants (DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007; Lee and Pachon 2007). In part, these Protestant Bush voters reflect a more general policy congruence between religious conservative voters and the Republican Party. In addition, the 2004 elections demonstrated that targeted Bush/Republican outreach could translate these policy and ideological connections into higher numbers of Republican votes in competitive elections. This ability to narrowly target Latino outreach (and, evidently, to win votes in close elections based on such efforts) is a new phenomenon in national campaign outreach to Latinos.

The 2004 election also saw a dramatic change in Latino representation. Two Latinos were elected to the U.S. Senate. Furthermore, the gubernatorial election of a sitting U.S. senator in New Jersey laid the foundation for a third Latino to join the Senate via the appointment

process. Considering that never before had more than one Latino served in the Senate at any given time, and that none had served since 1977, the 2004 elections represented an important change. One of the newly elected senators was Cuban American, also a first.

Latinos and the 2004 Presidential Elections: An Overview

The potential influence of the Latino vote was the focus of national political elites between the resolution of the 2000 election and the beginning of the 2004 primary season. Matthew Dowd, a pollster and senior consultant to the Republican National Committee (RNC), placed them at the center of Republican strategies for 2004 by noting in 2001 that if Bush won the same share of the minority vote in 2004 that he did in 2000, he would lose the election by 3 million votes (Kiefer 2001). Dowd's calculations focused on minority populations that could be won by the Republicans: Latinos and Asian Americans. Bush advisor Karl Rove took this to the next step by saying that Bush would lose the election unless he raised his share of the Latino vote to 40 percent from the roughly 35 percent he earned in 2000.

From the first days of his administration, the president engaged in targeted outreach, primarily symbolic outreach, to Latinos. This outreach included presidential radio addresses in Spanish, a White House Cinco de Mayo celebration, talk of a guest worker program that might evolve into more comprehensive immigration reform, and frequent visits with Mexican President Vicente Fox. Just as the Democrats were beginning the primary season, Bush made a final pre-election outreach effort with a renewed immigration proposal, this one more explicitly acknowledging that comprehensive reform would require a path to legalization for unauthorized immigrants (Bumiller 2004).

The Republican Party contributed to these outreach efforts by seeking to recruit Latino Republicans to compete for statewide office. These efforts included some candidates who were

ultimately successful (such as Florida's Mel Martinez, discussed below) and others who were not able to beat white Republicans in party primaries (such as California's Rosario Marin) (Marinucci 2003). State and local Republican parties were not as supportive of Latino outreach goals as the national party, a continuing dilemma Republicans face in their efforts to win more Latino votes.

The Democrats were not ceding the Latino vote, however. In addition to rhetorical appeals, the Democratic Party altered its primary calendar to move states with two large Latino populations – Arizona and New Mexico – much earlier in the primary calendar. The Democrats also tapped New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson to deliver a Spanish-language Democratic response to President Bush's State of the Union message (Salinas 2004).

The Democratic presidential candidates each made efforts to win Latino primary votes. In 2003, eight of the nine Democratic candidates spoke to the annual meeting of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO); absent was former Senator Carol Moseley Braun. Two – former Vermont Governor Howard Dean and U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) – addressed the meeting primarily in Spanish (Barabak 2003; Karamargin 2003). The first of the candidate debates sanctioned by the Democratic Party took place in New Mexico and was hosted by Ray Suarez of PBS and Maria Elena Salinas of Univision. Although not a debate of Latino issues, several of the candidates used the location to highlight their abilities to speak Spanish or to call for a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants. Observers noted, however, that none of the candidates at the debate “offered any new proposals tailored for the Hispanic community” (Balz and VandeHei 2003).

As his campaign developed a sense of inevitability, Governor Dean used this period before the primaries to capture endorsements from prominent Latino leaders, including six of the

twenty members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. In this strong pattern of endorsement for Dean, Latino members of Congress differed from their peers. Candidate Richard Gephardt, who had served as majority and minority leader in the House, received the most congressional endorsements among non-Latinos. No other Democratic candidate had the support of more than two Latino members (Eby 2003; Anderson 2003).

Despite these party and candidate efforts to reach Latino voters and to accentuate the importance of Latino votes in the period before the primaries, Latino voters did not appear to be particularly energized by the campaigns, nor did their preferences coalesce behind a single candidate. Pre-election polling did not show a dramatic move to the Republican Party as some Republican leaders hoped, but the polls did show some ambivalence toward the Democrats (Hulse 2003; Marrero 2004). What was not noticed (or at least discussed) at the time was that this ambivalence was particularly felt among adults who were less likely to vote in 2004. The core of the Latino electorate remained aligned with the Democratic Party and the party had created an opportunity, through the restructuring of the primary calendar, for Latinos to have a new voice in presidential politics.

A. The Primaries

Ultimately, however, as has been the case in each election since 1988 (de la Garza 1992), Latinos proved largely irrelevant to the selection of their parties' presidential nominees. On the Republican side, there was no suspense. President Bush faced no opposition in his bid for the Republican renomination. On the Democratic side, Latinos in Arizona and New Mexico could have shaped the selection of the Democratic nominee if they had taken positions distinct from other electorates or if they had voted at unusually high levels. California had also moved its

primary forward (to early March) in the hopes that an earlier primary would increase its voice in the presidential selection process.

Iowa and New Hampshire continued to lead the caucus and primary calendar in 2004. New Mexico and Arizona changed the traditional calendar by following in the next wave. New Mexico and North Dakota held the second wave of caucuses on February 3rd (following the January 19th Iowa caucus). Arizona (along with Delaware, South Carolina, Missouri, and Oklahoma) held its primary on February 3, following by only a week the January 27th New Hampshire primary. Some pundits characterized February 3rd as “Hispanic Tuesday” following the locution of a southern “Super Tuesday” in earlier elections.

New Hampshire and particularly Iowa saw the traditional extensive outreach efforts to all potential voters. This outreach included the handful of Latino voters in these states (approximately 12,000 in Iowa and 5,000 in New Hampshire), but these Latino electorates make up very small share of these states’ electorates (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005). The Dean campaign, energized by a large number of young volunteers from throughout the country, was particularly aggressive in seeking Latino voters. Latino Democrats in Iowa reported that they had been contacted multiple times by English- and Spanish-speaking Dean staff.

With the collapse of the Dean campaign after his defeat in New Hampshire (and, conclusively, after his defeat in the Wisconsin primary on February 17th), John Kerry became the Democratic frontrunner. Although he participated in collective candidate efforts to win Latino votes, he did little to win Latino primary votes in the early primary states (Avila 2003). Kerry had formed a Latino Steering Committee in January; its co-chairs were Henry Cisneros, former SBA Director Aida Alvarez, New Mexico House Speaker Ben Lujan, and Los Angeles Councilmember Antonio Villaraigosa. In his New Mexico campaign, Kerry tapped Cisneros, as

well as Senator Edward Kennedy, as surrogates to reach Latino voters. He also ran some Spanish language ads in both states (Kasindorf 2004). Overall, the Kerry campaign spent approximately \$78,000 on Spanish-language advertising in Arizona and New Mexico, Dean \$150,000, and Wesley Clark \$91,000, all in Arizona (Segal 2004a). There is little evidence that the other Democratic candidates conducted targeted Latino outreach in either state.

The Arizona primary and New Mexico caucuses offered an opportunity for Latino influence in the selection of the Democratic candidate (Roth 2004). Latinos did not express a voice distinct from other state electorates, however. In Arizona, exit polls indicated that 42 percent of Latinos supported John Kerry, roughly the same level of support of non-Hispanic white (Anglo) voters for Kerry. In New Mexico, approximately one-third of Latino and Anglo caucus participants supported Senator Kerry. Thus, at least among Latino Democrats in these two states, Latinos reinforced the choices of other electorates. This move toward Senator Kerry also appeared in states with few Latino voters that held primaries and caucuses on these days. There are no turnout data on Latino voters or caucus goers in either of these states, but there is no evidence that Latinos participated at unexpectedly high levels.

Primaries held in other states with large Latino populations occurred well after John Kerry had come to dominate the Democratic field (a possible exception is Nevada which held a February 14th caucus). California's change in its primary date proved futile; by March 2, the nomination race was largely over.

The pattern evident in Arizona and New Mexico of Latinos and other electorates voting for Senator Kerry at comparable rates continued in two other states that held primaries before Senator Kerry formally wrapped up the nomination in early March. In New York, 67 percent of Latinos and 66 percent of Anglos voted for Senator Kerry. Latinos were more likely than

Anglos to support Al Sharpton in New York, but Sharpton's Latino support remained in the single digits. In California, Latinos were somewhat more likely than Anglos to support Kerry (74 percent among Latinos and 64 percent among Anglos).

Despite the revised primary calendar, the Latino voice in the primaries can at best be viewed as subdued. Latino Democrats joined the Kerry bandwagon as it gained steam. Kerry's major opponent, Howard Dean, was effectively out of the race before large numbers of Latino voters were consulted. As a result, it is not possible to say if Latinos would have been a pro-Kerry force in a competitive race or were just following other Democrats to the new frontrunner (Sanchez 2004). None of the other candidates who were still active by the time the primary calendar moved to states with Latino voters – most notably John Edwards or Al Sharpton – caught on among Latino voters. Since Kerry did little to win these Latino votes through active campaigning, extensive elite endorsements, Latino-focused advertising, or substantive outreach around issues of importance to Latinos, it was not possible to say whether Kerry would have been able to energize Latino voters and mobilize Latinos who do not traditionally vote (the majority of the adult U.S. citizen Latino population) to support his candidacy in what was expected to be a close race (Marelius 2004). As a result, predictions of change and stability in the Latino voting patterns continued (Lester 2004; Moreno 2004; Mason 2004).

B. The Post-Primary Season

With both nominations sewn up by early March, the candidates had a long period to gear up for the fall campaign. Both used this period to raise money for their parties for the fall campaign and to focus their energies on key constituencies and states that were expected to be competitive. The period saw the beginning of the trend that would dominate the fall campaign whereby most campaign resources were focused on the states perceived to be competitive in the

race for Electoral College votes (Shaw 2006). Although this list would narrow later, the spring saw Bush and Kerry efforts to speak to Latinos and other potential voters in Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Florida, and Nevada (Garay 2004; Radelat 2004; Runningen and Jensen 2004; Morgan 2004). The flip side was the neglect of all voters in the states with the most Latino residents: California, Texas, New York, and Illinois, which followed the pattern of most recent presidential elections. This pre-general election outreach also saw campaign advertising in these competitive states, including ads primarily in Spanish that targeted Latino voters (Clark 2004; Lang 2004). Both campaigns also began to assemble the leadership networks that would provide the face for the targeted Latino outreach efforts – *Viva Bush!* and *Unidos con Kerry* – and the accompanying websites and campaign paraphernalia.

Both campaigns did venture beyond the competitive states to woo Latino elites. John Kerry spoke at the annual conferences of the National Council of La Raza and the National Association of Latino Elected Officials and by satellite to the League of United Latin American Citizens. After his selection as the vice presidential nominee by Senator Kerry, John Edwards spoke at the annual meeting of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project.

President Bush also used satellite technology to be present at these events. His campaign also sent surrogates, including White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez and Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson (Balz, 2004; Romano 2004, Associated Press 2004). These meetings offered the venue for the most specific discussion of Latino issues in the campaign. Senator Kerry, in particular, spoke to issues that topped the 2004 Latino issue agenda (discussed below): education, employment and the labor market, immigration reform, and Iraq and national security.

The Kerry campaign also used this period to select a vice presidential nominee. Among the finalists was New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (Senior 2004). Despite being among the handful of names discussed throughout the spring, Richardson continued to insist that he was not interested in the vice presidency. In addition to his Hispanic heritage, Richardson's potential strengths included his state and region of residence – New Mexico, a battleground state in the competitive Southwest – and his executive branch and diplomatic experience in the Clinton administration. Richardson's bluntness often appeared impolitic, leading many to wonder how serious he was in his pursuit of the vice presidency. He also didn't register with the American public. In a June survey, CNN found that voters were most enthusiastic about a Kerry-Edwards or Kerry-Gephardt ticket (CNN 2004). In early July, before Kerry announced his selection of Senator Edwards as the Democratic vice presidential nominee, Governor Richardson withdrew his name from consideration (Coleman 2004). There is no way of evaluating the degree to which discussions of a Richardson candidacy shaped Latino thinking about the campaign. At the time, Richardson was little known outside New Mexico, so it is unlikely that discussions of a Richardson nomination earned Senator Kerry any new Latino support.

Each candidate also used this pre-general election campaign period to hire staff. Following the pattern of his 2000 campaign, President Bush hired few Latinos for his campaign. Interestingly, Bush faced little criticism for this neglect. Despite the new pattern of Republican competition for Latino votes, their candidates are not held to the same expectations as Democratic candidates for hiring Latinos staff and assigning them to roles throughout the campaign. John Kerry, on the other hand, was routinely lambasted for his low share of Latino staffers. In April, Raul Yzaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza, denounced the “remarkable and unacceptable absence of Latinos in [the] campaign” (Wilgoren 2004).

Yzaguirre noted that Latinos who did work in the campaign were limited to jobs relating to outreach and not policy or finance. None of the staff that traveled with Kerry were Latino. Criticisms of the diversity of the Kerry staff in this pre-general election period spurred the appointment of new African American staff (Shepard 2004).

This failure to incorporate Latino staff throughout the campaign reflected a broader concern that began to be articulated about Kerry and that would recur throughout the campaign – that the Kerry campaign took Latino votes for granted and did not invest campaign resources in designing a campaign to speak to their policy needs. In April, Alvaro Cifuentes, Chair of the DNC’s Hispanic Caucus, circulated an email in which he charged that “the Kerry campaign has no message out there to the Hispanic community, nor has there been any reach-out effort in any state to the Hispanic electorate, at least with any perceivable sustainable strategy in mind” (Wilgoren 2004). A tangible manifestation of this was the absence of state campaigns to reach Latino voters in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, or Florida in late spring (Finnegan 2004). By contrast, Bush had a campaign presence and a Latino outreach effort in each of these states by May. It also ran ads targeted at Latinos in both Spanish and English. When asked about this gap, the Kerry campaign spoke of the need to focus on fundraising and its future plans to invest in a Spanish-language advertising blitz. In July, the Kerry campaign committed \$1 million to Spanish-language advertising in Florida, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina.

In past elections, this pre-general election period offered the opportunity for Latino leaders to organize to enhance the importance of Latino votes or to mobilize non-voters. Although there were certainly discussions of voter registration efforts to increase the number of potential Latino voters in this period, there was little effort at non-partisan elite coordination to

speak to Latino issues or policy needs. Perhaps, this reflects a legacy of the 2000 election and the increased partisan divisions in U.S. society or, perhaps, the absence of non-partisan leadership in Latino communities; regardless of the reason, there were few Latino voices heard in this period of the campaign that were not tied to one of the candidates or parties.

This period between the primaries and general election also allowed for the parallel campaign organizations that could be funded by private donations outside of the limits on the candidates and the parties. In the lingo of the 2004 campaign, these were called “527 organizations” from the section of the tax code that allowed for them to operate as tax exempt organizations and voter mobilization efforts to gear up and set goals. The voter mobilization efforts included some that focused primarily on Latinos; these promised to register one to two million new Latino voters, a number of new registrants comparable to those in the 2000 election (Díaz 2004). The better funded and better organized sought not just voter registration, but also turnout. These focused on the “battleground” states and were well funded and organized with an almost military precision. Latinos in the battle ground states – particularly Florida, New Mexico, and Nevada – certainly benefited from the mobilization efforts of these 527 organizations, but the majority of Latino non-voters did not.

The most prominent of the 527s focused on potential Democratic voters and were organized under the auspices of the New Democrat Network (NDN). The NDN funded a media campaign to reach Latino voters, focusing primarily on Spanish-language media in the battleground states. These efforts began in March with a commitment of \$5 million primarily for Spanish-language ad buys (Copp 2004). Ultimately, it spent about \$2.3 million; the Kerry campaign spent an additional \$1.3 million and the Democratic National Committee \$1.4 million (Segal 2006).

The Bush campaign also committed to high levels of spending on Spanish-language media, both through the Bush campaign and through a 527, Progress for America. Overall, the Bush campaign spent \$3.3 million by campaign's end and Progress for America an additional \$476,000.

The NDN came to be one of the major loci of Latino outreach, although this may not have been its goal at inception. The Kerry campaign did not articulate a clear strategy to reach out to Latino voters, and Latino leaders did not organize effectively to coordinate Latino outreach efforts. NDN, through its advertising, ultimately did more than either the Kerry campaign or the Democratic National Committee. With New Democratic Network resources in place, the Democratic National Committee seemed to follow the Kerry campaign in failing to design targeted outreach strategies for Latinos, following the model of the 2000 race. Although it financed and managed "coordinated campaigns" to elect Democrats at various levels of office in competitive areas (such as, for example, Kerry, Ken Salazar, John Salazar, and Democrats for State Senate and State House in Colorado), it did not focus these efforts extensively on states with high concentrations of Latinos.

State-level efforts to mobilize the Latino vote in the battleground states also began to appear in the Spring. *Viva Bush!* served as a organizational structure for state-level Latino mobilization efforts in New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, California, and Minnesota. The Kerry campaign relied more on groups independent of the campaign, as did Bush in Florida. These included a voter registration organization led by New Mexico's Bill Richardson – Moving America Forward – which focused on Latinos in New Mexico and Florida, and a national non-ethnic organization – America Coming Together – which focused on seventeen states, including a targeted Latino mobilization in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Florida

(Finnegan 2004). Overall, Florida saw more of these mobilization efforts than did other states. It remained competitive, so these efforts continued throughout the campaign season and included not just voter registration but also GOTV (Kinsler 2004).

C. The Conventions

Each party sought to use its convention as a tool to promote an image of inclusiveness. These efforts took somewhat different forms. The Democrats named New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson as Convention Chair and created a complete Spanish-language version of the convention web site. Republicans also ensured a Hispanic voice at their convention, but its role was somewhat more formal and muted than at the Democratic convention. Representative Henry Bonilla served as one of the six Deputy Permanent Chairs of the convention. Each party trumpeted its diversity, though the Republicans did so more cautiously – discussions of racial/ethnic diversity followed mentions of geographic diversity and the presence of large numbers of veterans in party press releases (Republican National Committee 2004). Media presentations of the delegates at the Republican convention often focused on the Black and Latino delegates, perhaps overstating their actual representation.

Each party saw an increase in the number of Hispanic delegates and alternates (in practical terms, there is little difference in the statuses since little is decided by “delegate” votes). More than 12 percent of the 4,300 delegates to the Democratic National Convention were Latino (Torrens 2004). The comparable figure in 2000 was slightly more than 10 percent (DeSipio and de la Garza 2005: 37). Latinos made up the largest minority delegation at the Republican National Convention. The Latino share of Republican delegates increased from approximately 8.3 percent in 2000 to 9.5 percent in 2004 (Republican National Committee 2004). Based on

their share of each party, Latinos were arguably underrepresented at the Democratic convention and overrepresented at the Republican convention.

While each convention offered opportunities for Latinos to speak, particularly Latino elected officials, the major speeches and those covered by the limited convention media coverage were not offered to Latinos. Just two Latinos spoke in prime time at the Democratic National Convention – Bill Richardson and Representative Robert Menendez (D-NJ) (Root 2004). This low representation in the prime-time slots led to last minute negotiations that added to the number of Latino speakers (Adair and Bousquet 2004). Other Latino Democrats who spoke to the convention included AFL-CIO Vice President Linda Chavez-Thompson, National Council of La Raza President Raul Yzaguirre, Los Angeles Supervisor Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilperson Antonio Villaraigosa, U.S. Representatives Hilda Solis, Linda Sanchez, Ciro Rodriguez, and Raul Grijalva, and some state and local elected officials.

To the extent that there was a widely recognized minority voice at the 2004 Democratic convention, it was that of Illinois Senate candidate Barack Obama, who electrified the convention on its second night in a prime time speech. Not only was his speech well crafted, it broke from the structure of each night having a theme, frequently focusing on Kerry's military service and national security issues. To the extent that Latinos watched the Democratic convention (about which there are no data), it was this night that spoke most clearly to Latino issues.

Latino voices were even more absent at the Republican National Convention in New York. On the convention's opening night, the presidential nephew George P. Bush addressed the convention in Spanish and English. Seeking to unite traditional Republican themes with a Latino outreach strategy, he observed that "Our party has always represented the interests of all people

seeking opportunity. We are the home of entrepreneurs, men and women who want to know the pride of accomplishment, the honor of self-sufficiency” (Purdum 2004). George P. Bush was joined in prime time by former U.S. Treasurer Rosario Marin.

Republican efforts to present themselves as a more diverse and inclusive party than in previous years were undercut by the release of a new book by columnist and former Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan (2004) just before the Republican convention began.

Among the indictments of President Bush in *Where the Right Went Wrong* was a renewed call for the culture war that Buchanan brought to the floor of the 1992 Republican convention.

President Bush’s support for immigration reform that, in some iterations, included a path to permanent residence for unauthorized immigrants in the United States caused disquiet among some Republican delegates.

Finally, the conventions offered the opportunity for Latino delegates and party activists to meet possible 2008 candidates as well as candidates for state office. With the likelihood that there would be no incumbent in either party in 2008, there were many potential candidates seeking inroads among Latino activists in both parties. Each convention also saw efforts to connect Latino delegates from throughout the country into ethnic caucuses and to connect the delegates to Latino civic organizations and campaign professionals.

D. The General Election

Ultimately, Latino voters were a footnote to the 2004 general election. The campaigns, the parties, and the 527 organizations focused most of their general election energies on a handful of battleground states with few Latino residents. Latino communities did not organize to influence the outcome of the presidential race and the issues of importance to Latino communities were not central to either presidential campaign. Perhaps most importantly, neither

candidate made Latino outreach central to his campaign's mission. This dearth of Latino outreach was particularly evident in the Kerry campaign, which did less than any recent Democratic nominee to win Latino votes. The Bush campaign, following the model of the 2000 race, did much more than recent Republican candidates and made Latino votes more competitive in two of the battleground states – New Mexico and Florida.

Labor Day 2004 – the traditional start of the general election campaign season – saw a tight race in the national polls and a widespread concern that the 2004 race might again result in a contested outcome. Both campaigns anticipated that victory would result from mobilizing voters in one of a handful of battleground states. These competitive states numbered no more than twenty one in September, with just nine being true toss-ups (Seelye 2004). Of these, Latinos constituted a significant share of the population in six. They included two states leaning to President Bush – Arizona and Nevada – and four toss-ups – Colorado, New Mexico, Florida, and New Jersey. By mid- to late-October, efforts to win Latino votes narrowed to three of these states: New Mexico, Florida, and Colorado. The competition in Colorado increasingly focused on the Senate race between Ken Salazar and Pete Coors. Thus, the opportunities for campaigning in Latino communities and discussing issues of importance to Latino communities were few and far between. Most of the campaigns' time and energy focused on the battleground states of the industrial Midwest.

Latinos in New Mexico and Florida did see extensive efforts to win their votes and to ensure that they would vote. These efforts included candidate visits, visits by surrogates representing the candidates, advertising, and voter mobilization by 527 organizations (Nieves 2004; DeBose 2004; de Córdoba 2004). In New Mexico, for example, both campaigns had field organizers focusing on Latino turnout in all of the state's counties. This outreach included door-

to-door canvassers and phone banks. These mobilization efforts were reinforced by advertising campaigns; in the case of the Bush campaign, these had been in place since March. Latino leaders were happy to see that new registrants in the state had the same portion of Latinos as did the state voter registration rolls at the beginning of the election year. Considering the socioeconomic disadvantage of Hispanics in New Mexico relative to Anglos, this was thought to bode well for turnout in November. Republican outreach appears to have been somewhat more targeted than were Democratic efforts. In particular, in addition to general outreach, GOP Latino outreach to Hispanics blended with its outreach to places of worship. This Republican effort to mobilize religiously observant Latinos included both Catholics and Protestants.

Florida Latinos also saw competition for their votes from President Bush and Senator Kerry. The Florida Latino vote included both Republican-leaning areas (Miami and environs) and Democratic-leaning areas (Orlando and the I-4 corridor). What was interesting in 2004 is that each candidate had to both defend his base and compete in the other candidate's areas of strength (de Córdoba 2004; DeBose 2004). Bush faced some challenge among Cuban Americans because of new travel restrictions added to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. We discuss this issue later, but it is important to recognize that it created a challenge that forced President Bush to use time and campaign resources to campaign among voters who should have been safe Republican voters. The Kerry campaign believed it could win a higher share of Cuban American votes in Miami than had Al Gore in 2000 (de Córdoba 2004). In the central part of the state, the Bush campaign challenged Latino voters who had been more reliably Democratic in previous elections, as the 2000 election results suggested that their partisan loyalties might be in flux (Balz and Morin 2004).⁴ In particular, the Bush campaign focused on religiously observant Latinos in Orlando and along the I-4 corridor, thus paralleling efforts in New Mexico.

The Kerry Latino campaign in both of these competitive states was well organized on the ground, it faced the same challenge as did the overall campaign throughout the 2004 election – it was never able to articulate a message to Latino communities. The only consistent Kerry messages to Latinos were (1) the shared Catholicism of Kerry and many Latinos, and (2) Kerry's support for a Democratic policy agenda that traditionally receives more Latino support than does the Republican agenda (Navarrette 2004*b*). Kerry never proved a particularly successful messenger when campaigning in Latino communities and he failed to tailor his message to the particular needs of Latinos.

The candidate's wife, Teresa Heinz Kerry, was often used to speak to Latino audiences (Agence France Presse 2004). Her intermittent claim of being an immigrant and in some sense a Latina did not always meet a receptive audience (Navarrette 2004*a*). Kerry's surrogates in the fall campaign, including Henry Cisneros, Antonio Villaraigosa, and Bill Richardson could speak more directly to Latino concerns, but they did not add excitement to the Kerry campaign. The campaign paid a price for the absence of a Latino message and the dearth of excitement surrounding John Kerry in Latino communities.

The Bush campaign was also negligent in terms of developing a Latino message. The president often spoke of his personal connection to Latinos and would occasionally hint at support for a legalization program as part of comprehensive immigration reform. Beyond this issue, however, President Bush relied on the traditional Republican tropes of moral conservatism, opportunity, and patriotism when speaking to Latino communities. The Bush campaign was able to target these messages, particularly the moral conservative message, to Latino churchgoers, particularly in the battleground states. Bush's failure to craft a distinctive Latino message faced less criticism than did Kerry's neglect.

Both campaigns (and their related 527s) focused their media campaigns on Spanish- rather than English-language media (Segal 2004b). This represents a change from the early period analyzed in our series (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1996); the campaigns now perceive that Spanish-dominant voters are a sizeable enough audience to merit considerable investment. These Spanish-dominant Latino voters are largely naturalized U.S. citizens. For their English-dominant children, the ads demonstrate a cultural sensitivity on the part of the candidate. The content of these Spanish-language ads is not very different from the English-language ads (though the visuals vary considerably), so the campaigns must be confident that they are reaching English-dominant Latinos through their non-ethnic media purchases.

Nationally, the Kerry campaign spent nearly \$1.3 million on Spanish language advertising and the Bush campaign \$3.3 million (Segal 2006). The gap reversed, however, when party and 527 money are included in the calculations. Overall, Kerry and the Democrats spent approximately 57 percent of the \$8.7 million spent on 2004 Spanish-language media. The campaigns and parties each spent around \$2.3 million in Florida and \$500,000 to \$800,000 in New Mexico. Kerry and the Democrats spent about twice as much in Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado as Bush and the Republicans (\$775,000 versus \$365,000 in Arizona; \$593,000 versus \$315,000 in Nevada, and \$395,000 versus \$203,000 in Colorado). The Kerry campaign also spent small amounts on Spanish-language advertising in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and North Carolina. The funds included both television and radio advertisements and included some ads with content similar to English-language ads and some that was produced uniquely for Latino communities.

The visuals of the Spanish-language ads used Latino community settings and were not simply those used in English-language advertising, as had been the case in some previous

campaigns. As with the non-Latino advertising, the Spanish-language ads disproportionately focused on national security, the war in Iraq, military service (Kerry's), and economic issues. Several spoke generically about Hispanic contributions to U.S. society. The Kerry campaign and the New Democratic Network each ran one commercial that focused on the Cuban community, specifically concerning the new restrictions on travel to Cuba imposed by the Bush administration. Other than this ad, all were more generically Hispanic. Kerry also used Bill Richardson in one ad.⁵

As was the case in 2000, Latino campaign staff were sparse in both campaigns (John Kerry Campaign Organization 2004; Bush-Cheney'04, Inc. 2004a). For the Kerry campaign, Luis Elizondo-Thompson directed Hispanic outreach. Unusually for a modern presidential campaign, the Bush campaign did not have a Latino outreach director, although it did have an African American outreach director. Instead, it formed a National Hispanic Steering Committee in April. More practically, its media office, including Lionel Sosa and Alex Castellanos, coordinated Latino media outreach and were often mentioned in the press as the coordinators of Bush's Latino outreach. The Bush campaign did have Latino staff as Southwest Field coordinator, as Deputy Director of Voter Contact-Phones, and as Specialty Media Outreach coordinator. In addition to Mr. Elizondo-Thompson, the Kerry campaign employed Latino staff as field director for New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, as Senior Political Advisor (primarily focused on community outreach), as Deputy Press Secretary, and as Director of Hispanic Media (two staff people). In each campaign, Latinos made up less than five percent of the national campaign staff.

Similar patterns appear in Bush and Kerry campaign organizations in the Latino battleground states. Of the thirty-eight leading staff of the Florida Kerry campaign, the Florida

Democratic Party, and pro-Kerry 527 organizations in the state, just two were Latino (Kerry and Allies-Organization, Florida 2005). The story was somewhat more inclusive in New Mexico: of the fifty-five leading staff of the Kerry campaign, state Democratic Party, and pro-Kerry 527 organizations, sixteen were Latino (Kerry and Allies-Organization, New Mexico 2005). The Bush-Cheney state campaigns generally had fewer Hispanic staff. In Florida, of forty senior Bush-Cheney staff, two were Latino (Bush-Cheney '04, Inc. 2004*b*). In New Mexico, the Bush-Cheney campaign had twenty-two senior staff, of whom four were Latino (Bush-Cheney '04, Inc. 2004*c*).

We continue to find this dearth of Latino campaign staff to be odd. In the 1996 race, the Clinton campaign set what we thought would become the new standard for, at a minimum, Democratic candidates – the employment of Latino staff not just in Latino outreach roles but throughout the campaign (DeSipio, de la Garza, and Setzler 1999). This pattern, however, was not the case in 2000 or 2004. In 2004, it is particularly telling of the above-noted inability of the Kerry campaign to identify a strategy to energize Latino voters who would otherwise be predisposed to supporting the Massachusetts Senator.

In the end, any promises or expectations for Latino outreach were lost in the exigencies of a campaign highly focused on a handful of states that were primarily non-Latino in population. Certainly the small number of Latinos in battleground states such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ohio did receive attention, but it would be difficult to characterize this as a coordinated Latino campaign. Perhaps if the race had focused more on states with large Latino electorates, the candidates or their campaigns would have found more effective strategies to reach Latino voters and speak to the issues of most concern. Voter mobilization, probably the

greatest electoral need in Latino communities, was neglected in 2004 except in the three states with anticipated close outcomes.

E. The Electoral College

As the 2000 election taught the nation, the geographic distribution of votes for the candidates is more important than the number of votes. Voters do not select candidates but instead Electoral College delegates who promise to support the candidate to whom they are pledged. These largely unknown, but politically loyal individuals meet without fanfare to elect the president soon after the official election. Table 1.1 lists the number and percentage of Latino delegates for each party from 1992 to the present.

**** Insert Table 1.1 approximately here ****

We offer the caveat that we rely on Latino surnames to identify Latino Electoral College delegates, as we did with Latino campaign staff. If Bill Richardson were a delegate, he might not be counted but for his prominence. This table, nevertheless, provides a rough estimate and allows us to check for trends over time. In 2004, there were fewer Latino delegates from either party than in 2000. As before, there were more Democratic (fifteen) than Republican (ten) delegates, but this represents a decline from twenty-four Democrats and thirteen Republicans in 2000. In addition, while the percentage of total Latino delegates had previously increased over time (from 5.39 percent in 1992 to 5.57 percent in 1996 to 6.87 percent in 2000), the 2004 Electoral College was only 4.65 percent Latino.

One explanation for the overall and partisan fluctuations is the specific states the candidates won. The two parties in the same state may have different proportions of Hispanic electors on the ballot, so the basket of states won by each candidate may affect party Hispanic

representation in the Electoral College. The switch of New Mexico from the Democrats in 2000 to the Republicans in 2004, for example, reduced the number of Latinos in the Electoral College.

On the one hand, the position of delegate is honorific and the individuals are chosen because of demonstrated party loyalty. While there are few practical constraints on how delegates vote, even the closely contested and controversial 2000 election saw only one delegate shift her vote. On the other hand, a small number of electors could affect the outcome in a close contest, and while this did not happen in 2000 or 2004, it cannot be ruled out for the future.

F. Latino Issues in the National Campaign

What issues were in the minds of Latinos during the 2004 campaign? Table 1.2 illustrates the responses of registered voters in mid-October to a pre-election survey administered by the Washington Post, Univision, and the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. The survey asked respondents to identify the single most important issue in their vote for president. The table is different from those in previous volumes, as the events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq significantly changed the public policy priorities of Americans. As DeSipio and de la Garza (2005, 48) noted in the previous volume, *Muted Voices*, “Foreign policy continues to not be a relevant concern among Latinos,” but it was an unavoidable part of the 2004 campaign.

Nevertheless, the most important issue for Latinos in 2005 was the economy, with 26.7 percent of Latinos identifying it as central to their vote choice. The second and third most important issues relate to post-9/11 concerns – terror (20.2 percent) and the war in Iraq (15.2 percent). While it is not entirely clear how to interpret these responses, one might guess that “terror” indicates a voter concerned primarily with security issues, while “Iraq” may indicate a voter concerned that the war is not going well. The fourth most important issue is education (15.2 percent), which is traditionally the top issue for Latinos. In 2000, it was rated by Latinos

as the most important issue facing the nation and facing Latinos. The next most important issue is health, followed by immigration and then crime. It is worth noting that while many believe immigration is a high priority issue for Latinos, this survey confirms the findings of previous research. Latinos do not emphasize the immigration issue, and more generally, Latino issue priorities are quite similar to those of Anglos (DeSipio 2007).

** Insert Table 1.2 approximately here **

As was the case in recent elections, there were few issues discussed by the candidates in the 2004 presidential race unique to the Latino community. However, one issue did emerge from a Latino community – Cuban Americans in Florida. Because of the potentially central role of Florida in selecting the president, this unique Cuban American concern took on national importance. The issue emerged from Bush administration efforts to further reduce economic interactions with Cuba or to travel to Cuba. The group in U.S. society most likely to be effected by the changes was recent Cuban émigrés seeking to send remittances or prescriptions to relatives or to visit the island (Glionna 2004). Non-Cuban Americans had long been barred from sending money or visiting Cuba. The Bush administration extended these limits to people in the U.S. who had close relatives in Cuba or who were born in Cuba, although small amounts of money could continue to be sent.

Interestingly, these new restrictions came in response to calls from Cuban American leaders to tighten the economic embargo of Cuba (Wallsten 2004). These limits, and the outrage they engendered, led many to believe that divisions might emerge in the Cuban American vote with more recent émigrés (who had naturalized) being more likely to support Kerry or not to vote. The Bush campaign was clearly concerned about this possibility and invested in advertising in Miami media markets. The Bush campaign spent nearly \$1.5 million in Miami

(Segal 2006). The Kerry campaign spent just \$197,000, although this was supplemented with \$1.2 million in Party and NDN advertising. In the end, there is little evidence that this issue shaped many Cuban American votes (Balz and Morin 2004). Nevertheless, the possibility of political cleavages among Cuban Americans based on recency of migration and the presence or absence of relatives in Cuba is one to watch for in future elections.

A second issue that appeared in the 2004 race was not as uniquely focused on Latinos, but certainly had the potential to shape the power of their votes. This was claims of new forms of voter intimidation based on identification requirements included in the Help America Vote Act for first-time voters and state-passed voting identification requirements that could be applied more broadly (Kurlantzick 2004). These requirements disproportionately effect Latinos for three reasons. First, the poor are less likely to have identification than others in U.S. society. Second, the rules are applied unevenly. Fears about non-citizen voting (of which there is virtually no evidence on the ground), could cause Latinos to be more likely to be asked for identification than others. Finally, signage at polling places listing identification requirements and, particularly, penalties could prove confusing or off-putting for new voters and voters whose first language is not English, again disproportionately reducing Latino votes. Latino civic organizations also identified more localized efforts to reduce the Latino vote (Hendricks 2004).

Latino organizations responded as they had in past elections – condemning these policies and setting up phone banks to collect reports of voter intimidation (National Council of La Raza 2004a, 2004b). On election day, voter intimidation and rules that disadvantaged minorities did become an issue. Urban and minority voters in Ohio, few of whom were Latino, faced hours long delays in voting and required court intervention to keep the polls open (Highton 2006;

Kennedy 2006). Again, this issue of new voting requirements and new forms of intimidation needs to be monitored in upcoming elections.

Although Latino leaders would periodically seek to interject specific issues into the campaign, their organizational efforts were few in 2004. In part, this probably reflected the electoral map of the campaign and its exclusion of the states with the largest Latino populations. As has been the case in recent presidential election cycles, coalitions of Latino organizations raised funds for and implemented national voter registration drives (Gonzales 2004). Ultimately, these voter registration efforts claimed to register two million new Latino voters since 2000 (a goal they do not appear to have met). One of the key players in 2004, one that had been largely absent in 2000, was the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration, which is funded by Puerto Rico's taxpayers. It claimed to register 322,000 new Latino voters, including many in Florida. Its focus on Latinos rather than just Puerto Ricans caused some controversy in Puerto Rico.

These Latino-led voter mobilization efforts generally focused on voter registration rather than GOTV efforts. While they certainly added new registered voters to the rolls, they did not add a commensurate number of new voters (discussed later). However, that connection was more likely to be made in the battleground states, and particularly Florida, where the parties invested heavily in get-out-the-vote efforts among the newly registered.

The leaders of the major Latino organizations also sought, as they had in presidential elections since 1984, to craft a consensus document on issues facing Latino communities – the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda.⁶ The prominence of this document has been in steady decline and probably reached a nadir in 2004. Despite some tentative efforts, no document was produced and neither campaign had the opportunity to speak to the leading Latino organizations

about a broad Latino-focused agenda in a formal setting. Nor was there any other effort to shape a cohesive Latino policy agenda for the campaign.

Latinos and 2004 Non-Presidential Races

Where Latino influence was limited in the 2004 presidential race, it was felt more dramatically in the year's Senate races. Two Latinos, Mel Martinez (R) in Florida and Ken Salazar (D) in Colorado, were elected to the U.S. Senate. The election of Senator John Corzine (D-NJ) to the New Jersey governorship led to the appointment of U.S. Representative Robert Menendez (D) to the U.S. Senate in 2005. Never before had two Latinos served simultaneously in the U.S. Senate, let alone three, and never before had a Latino represented a state other than New Mexico in the U.S. Senate.

The Martinez and Salazar elections reflected the abilities of both candidates to build multi-ethnic coalitions among voters and to build strong donor bases. Neither Colorado nor Florida Latinos have the numbers or political influence to elect statewide candidates no matter how cohesive their votes. Equally importantly, and particularly so for the Republican Party in the case of the Martinez candidacy, victory these efforts reflected national party calculations about the need to promote Latino candidacies at the state level in order to build Latino support for non-Latino party candidates. These two candidacies offer models for state-level campaigns to elect Latinos in other states.

Senator Martinez, a naturalized U.S. citizen who migrated from Cuba to the United States while in his teens in 1962, brought a rich set of professional credentials to the Florida Senate race (Barone and Cohen 2006). After an unsuccessful race for Florida Lt. Governor in 1994, Martinez was elected as Chair of the Orange County (FL) government, a position whose name was later changed to Mayor of the county to reflect its executive responsibilities. In 2001,

President Bush nominated Martinez to serve as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Bush administration tapped Martinez during his service to speak to the Spanish-language media, not just on behalf of HUD but about Bush policies more generally. He served a Secretary until he resigned in December 2003 to run for the U.S. Senate. The Senate seat was opened when Senator Bob Graham (D) began a presidential campaign and indicated that he would not simultaneously run for reelection to the Senate. Martinez did not initially seem interested in pursuing the U.S. Senate seat, instead focusing on the governorship in 2006. He eventually entered the race with backing from the White House and leading Senate Republicans, including Senators George Allen and Rick Santorum, then rising stars in their party.

The open Senate seat attracted a large number of candidates from both parties. Martinez was not initially the leading candidate for the Republican nomination. Representative Mark Foley raised over three million dollars by June 2003, but he dropped out of the race when he was 'outed' in the media. The White House appeared to intercede to discourage some high profile candidates from pursuing the race, most notably Representative Katherine Harris (who would run and lose in 2006) (Ceaser and Bush 2005: 152).

In the primary, Martinez faced former Representative Bill McCollum, who had lost a Senate bid in 2000. The primary race was ugly. McCollum attacked Martinez as a trial lawyer and "failed HUD Secretary." Martinez defended his work as a lawyer, spoke of his rags to riches successes, and attacked McCollum as anti-family because of his support for a hate crimes bill. The Martinez campaign ran one commercial that tied McCollum to the "radical homosexual agenda" because of his support for these bills. Martinez withdrew this add at the request of Florida Governor Jeb Bush. Throughout the race, Martinez maintained the support of the White

House and national Republican leaders. Because of this support, state Republican politicians and activists may have worried that a failure to support Martinez could result in negative consequences (see Moreno, Ilcheva, and Flores, this volume).

Despite the vitriol of the race, Martinez won the primary handily (45 percent to 31 percent). He won all sections of the state but did particularly well among the largely Cuban Republican electorate in Miami-Dade County. In Miami-Dade, Martinez took nearly four in five votes.

The general election followed the pattern of negativity in the Republican primary, though with considerably more money. Martinez spent nearly \$13 million, and his Democratic opponent Betty Castor, a former legislator and president of the University of South Florida, spent \$11.5 million. The race was interrupted by four hurricanes and was overshadowed by the hard-fought presidential race, which consumed both opportunities to advertise and potential campaign volunteers. The candidates differed on hurricane relief, with Martinez focusing on tax-exempt development bonds to target damaged parts of the state and zero-interest loans for businesses. Martinez also accused Castor of being soft on terrorism because of a controversy surrounding a University of South Florida professor. Castor sought to present herself as an “independent Democrat” and Martinez as a rubber stamp for the White House. Martinez continued to tap his own success story as a key message in his campaign. Like McCollum, Castor tried to attack Martinez based on failures at HUD during his term.

Unlike the Republican primary, the vote in the general election was very close. Martinez won by just less than 83,000 votes. Cuban American votes were particularly important to the Martinez victory, though his appeal did not necessarily extend to non-Cuban Latinos. In the end, however, Martinez did better among Latino voters than did President Bush; CNN analysis of the

National Exit Poll showed that President Bush carried 56 percent of Florida Latino votes and Martinez won 60 percent.

Colorado also elected a Latino Senator in 2004. Attorney General Ken Salazar defeated Peter Coors, heir to the brewery of the same name, somewhat more decisively than Mel Martinez defeated Betty Castor – 51 percent to 47 percent. Salazar, whose brother also won an open House seat from Colorado, tapped the iconography of rural Colorado as well as his Hispanic roots to win the Senate seat for the Democrats (Florio 2004). Salazar's victory is all the more remarkable considering that John Kerry lost the state by a 52 to 47 percent margin.

The Colorado Senate seat opened with the retirement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R), a decision that came as something of a surprise. Initially, each party saw a large pool of candidates for the open seat. On the Democratic side, several of the leading candidates who initially entered the race withdrew and endorsed Attorney General Salazar. The Republican Party saw a more competitive race between Coors Brewing Chair Pete Coors and U.S. Representative Bob Schaffer. Although Coors was the odds-on favorite, he proved to be a less-than-adept campaigner with a policy agenda and corporate history – mostly notably a proposal to lower the Colorado drinking age and the Coors company's support of Colorado's gay pride festival – that made him suspect to many Republican primary voters (Greene 2004). Ultimately, Coors won the primary by a healthy margin, but he entered the general election without the advantage that a Republican candidate would have expected in recent Colorado elections (Florio and Bartels 2004; Barone and Cohen 2006).

The fall campaign was fractious and ultimately proved to be one of the few Democratic victories. Throughout the campaign, polls suggested that it was a toss-up. Salazar won the fundraising battle, raising nearly \$10 million for his race compared to \$7.8 million for Coors.

Salazar ran independently of the Kerry campaign and stressed his deep family ties to Colorado. Salazar focused his campaign on environmental issues, health care, and tax equity. He also continued the trend from the Republican primary of attacking Coors and showing his inexperience. He particularly noted Coors' inconsistent positions on education vouchers. When Coors attacked Salazar for being a lawyer and claimed there were already too many lawyers in the Senate, Salazar responded that there were too many multi-millionaires in the Senate. What Salazar did not place at the center of his agenda were issues framed in terms of the Latino community (see Juenke and Sampaio, this volume). Instead, he ran a decidedly non-ethnic campaign. In his campaign, Coors tried to galvanize moral conservatives through discussion of his support for the Family Marriage Amendment, but the legacy of the primary undermined this outreach. Coors also focused on his support for President Bush and for the war in Iraq, though he undercut this position somewhat in October by saying that he might not have voted for it in 2003 had he known what he knew in 2004.

Salazar won the race with a comfortable margin – 51 to 47 percent. CNN analysis of National Election Poll data indicates that the Salazar victory was the result of minority voters. He carried 80 percent of the Black vote and 72 percent of the Latino vote, while losing the white vote by the same margin he won statewide – 51 to 47 percent. Salazar did slightly better among Colorado Latinos than did John Kerry, but not quite as well in the small Colorado African American community. Kerry lost the White vote in Colorado by a 54 to 44 percent margin. Ultimately, Salazar owed his victory to urban and suburban voters, but he was able to keep the gap sufficiently narrow in rural areas to ensure his victory. John Kerry, for example, took just 35 percent of the rural vote; Ken Salazar was able to win 45 percent.

Two new Latino members joined the U.S. House of Representatives after the 2004 election.⁷ Henry Cuellar won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives by defeating a fellow Democrat and incumbent U.S. Representative, Ciro Rodriguez, in the 2004 primary. John Salazar defeated Republican Gregg Walcher in an open-seat race in Colorado, a seat previously held by a Republican. The 2004 elections therefore resulted in a net increase of one Latino member of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Despite Cuellar's claim that a primary challenge was not an unusual occurrence in South Texas, it was highly unusual in the House of Representatives and brought a great deal of attention to the race. Rodriguez was at a relative disadvantage because the district had been significantly redrawn in 2003 as part of a GOP mid-Census effort to weaken Texas Democratic House incumbents. Part of this redistricting was to move several heavily Hispanic counties out of the district and to move more of Laredo (Cuellar's home town) into the district. Though both Democrats, the two candidates offered distinct views on policy. Cuellar had endorsed President Bush in 2000 (but supported John Kerry in 2004) and had served as Republican Governor Rick Perry's appointed Secretary of State in 2001. Rodriguez had the most liberal voting record of Texas's six Latino members of Congress (Barone and Cohen 2006).

The race proved very close, with Rodriguez initially winning by 145 votes out of approximately 50,000 cast. Rodriguez carried the parts of the district around his San Antonio base and Cuellar the parts around his hometown of Laredo. After a recount, a judicial challenge, and an appeal, Cuellar won the primary by 58 votes (Off the Kuff 2004). He then won an easy victory in the general election, garnering 59 percent of the vote. In that same election, President Bush won 53 percent of the votes in the district.

John Salazar's Colorado congressional victory also came in a Republican-leaning district, though one that has been more traditionally viewed in that light (President Bush carried the district by 10 percentage points or more in 2000 and 2004 and Republicans had a six percentage point registration advantage). The post-2000 redistricting had added some Democratic areas and Latino population concentrations. There was no incumbent in the 2004 race; Scott McInnis (R) announced in 2003 that he would not seek reelection after having served six terms.

Salazar was a sitting member of the Colorado assembly, but he was probably better known in the district for organizing against a developer's efforts to sell San Luis Valley water rights for use in Denver (Barone and Cohen 2006: 330; Reid 2004). Salazar's candidacy was advantaged by the lack of competition he faced in the primary. His general election opponent, Greg Walcher, faced stiff primary competition, including a strong race by the brother-in-law of the retiring representative.

In the general election, Salazar positioned himself as a centrist and emphasized his ties to the district and his occupation as a farmer. Issues also worked to his advantage. Walcher had supported a 2003 state initiative to issue \$2 billion in bonds for water projects that was highly unpopular in the rural parts of the state; Salazar noted at most of his campaign appearances that "Walcher stood on the side of urban interests while I was fighting for the rural areas here in the 3rd District" (Reid 2004), not a claim a Democrat could routinely make. Walcher tried to attack Salazar on social conservative issues such as abortion and gay marriage,⁸ but ultimately these issues did not drive the election in the district. Salazar focused on agricultural issues, repeal of the estate tax, and the rights of gun owners (Draper 2004).

Ultimately, Salazar won with 51 percent of the vote, which was significantly better than John Kerry's 44 percent in the district. His victory was undoubtedly assisted by the excitement

generated by his brother's Senate campaign and the similar message about the Salazar brothers that the two campaigns promoted. John Salazar's campaign, however, deserves significant credit for being able to raise more than \$1.6 million for his campaign. This slightly exceeded the \$1.5 million raised by Greg Walcher.

Campaign finance data for House campaigns that involve a Latino candidate are found in Table 1.4. The first row shows the money raised by Latino incumbents in three election cycles: 1995-96, 1999-2000, and 2003-04. Over time, Latino incumbent fundraising increased, although the rate of growth slowed in the last four years (11.8 percent) in comparison to the 1996-2000 cycle (107 percent). The average amount, \$853,000, is about \$160,000 less than that raised by the average House incumbent. Because many incumbents run unopposed, we also calculate the funds raised by Latino incumbents facing major party candidates. This was slightly more – \$941,000 – which represented a small and possibly meaningless decline (\$60,000) from the previous presidential election cycle.

** Insert Table 1.4 approximately here **

Most challengers raise significantly less money than incumbents, and this is also true for Latino challengers and those who challenge Latino incumbents. Major party challengers to Latino members of Congress raised \$85,043, which was a \$23,000 decline from the previous presidential election cycle. Furthermore, Latino challengers to non-Latino incumbents raised less money in 2003-04 than in 1999-2000. Nevertheless, Latino challengers to Latino incumbents showed an average increase of \$90,000 (to an average of \$227,788) in comparison to 1999-2000. This suggests that political competition in Latino districts is increasing, perhaps as serious Latino challenges to non-Latino incumbents are on the decline.

In open seat elections, we see considerable spending increases over time. In the 1995-96 campaign, Latino open seat candidates raised almost half a million dollars on average. This declined considerably in 1999-2000 – to less than one hundred thousand dollars on average – but then increased in 2003-04 to \$752,573. Even this amount is less than the average funds raised by all open seat candidates – \$1.2 million.

Latinos also saw gains at other levels of elective office. The number of Latinos in state-level elective office increased, particularly in the lower houses of state legislatures. Prior to the election, one hundred sixty one Latinos served in state assemblies and sixty one in state senates (NALEO Educational Fund 2004*a*). After the election, the number of Latinos in lower legislative houses increased to one hundred seventy one, and the number in state senates decreased by one to sixty (NALEO Educational Fund 2004*b*).

The 2004 election saw a final dimension of Latino influence: a dramatic growth in spending by Latino political action committees (PACs). The role of PACs and 527s are growing in U.S. national elections and Latino leaders are using this new tool to raise and spend campaign money. Latino PAC spending grew from \$605,000 in 2000 to slightly more than \$1.8 million in 2004 (Russell 2005). The largest Latino PAC in 2004 – the Latino Alliance – was formed by Republican Latinos seeking to support Latino Republican candidates. Its president is columnist and unsuccessful Bush nominee for Secretary of Labor Linda Chavez. It spent nearly \$700,000 in 2004. The second largest Hispanic PAC in 2004 – the Hispanic Democratic Organization – supported Democrats running for office. The third largest Latino PAC – the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC – focused its money on “candidates running for the United States Congress, who oppose any economic measures that directly or indirectly finance and prolong the repressive machinery of the Castro regime.” However, a review of the expenditures of these PACs at

opensecrets.org suggests the first two spent relatively little money directly on candidates. Instead, they spent money to raise money and support staff and offices. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, on the other hand, spent most of its resources on candidate contributions and made those contributions in a very bipartisan manner. While Latinos therefore tapped a new resource for political influence in 2004, the impact of party-focused PACs was limited because they did not expand the financial resources available to candidates running for office.

The state ballot initiative most relevant to Latinos in 2004 was Arizona's Proposition 200, the Protect American Now initiative. It received a great deal of national media attention and would have prohibited "public benefits" for unauthorized immigrants. Following the logic of California's 1994 Proposition 187, Proposition 200 added additional prohibitions on services to unauthorized immigrants including a requirement that voters prove their U.S. citizenship and, according to its critics, requirements that local public officials deny authorized immigrants access to parks, libraries, or emergency services, such as fire departments (Kammer 2004; National Council of La Raza 2004c). The campaign in support of Proposition 200 grew from concerns in Arizona about increased unauthorized migration that resulted from enforcement efforts on the California-Mexico border. While national and state Latino leaders strongly opposed the proposition, it is not so clear that this outrage spread to Latino voters. Supporters of 200 were careful to limit their ire to unauthorized migrants and not, as had been in the case in California in 1994, expand the rhetoric to a more general incitement of Latinos (see Avalos, Magaña, and Pantoja in this volume). Ultimately, the Proposition passed with 56 percent of the statewide vote. Latinos only narrowly opposed the initiative by a 47 to 53 percent margin.

Colorado voters considered a ballot issue that, had it passed and spread to other states, would have served Latino interests. Amendment 36 would have changed Colorado's allocation

of Electoral College votes to a proportional system (Johnson 2004). Although this proposal was ultimately rejected by voters, it opens the possibility that states will consider alternatives to what is now the dominant “winner take all” pattern of allocating Electoral College votes. Changes such as this would increase competition in states that are now solidly in the hands of one of the parties – the states in which the vast majority of the Latino population resides – and increase the incentive for candidates and parties to invest in voter mobilization in solidly partisan areas.

Latino Votes and National Elections

Expectations for Latino influence build from a recognition that the size of the Latino population is growing rapidly and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This perception is generally correct, but it masks population characteristics that dampen the Latino political voice. Table 1.4 shows that Latinos make up 14.2 percent of the U.S. population and 12.6 percent of the voting-age population. In the parallel volume discussing the 1996 election, *Awash in the Mainstream*, de la Garza and DeSipio (1999) noted an overall Latino population of 28.4 million individuals; the comparable figure in 2004 was just over 40 million. Of these, 27 million are of voting age, and 16 million are voting age U.S. citizens. Compared to other racial and ethnic groups in U.S. society, however, Latinos have a higher share of the population who either cannot or do not participate in electoral politics. Latinos make up just 8.2 percent of the *U.S. citizen* voting age population. This non-citizenship challenge helps to explain why Latino political power does not match the size of the Latino population: there are 11 million Latino adult non-citizens who currently cannot vote.

** Insert Table 1.4 approximately here **

Although political districts in the United States are based on overall population, and elected officials are tasked with representing these districts, it is also true that politicians are

more likely to respond to those who elected them to office, or who might be expected to exercise the vote in the next election. Latinos may constitute a significant and growing share of the population, but this is no guarantee that political representation is inevitable or even likely. Relying on population size alone to generate political power – what de la Garza (1996) called “El Cuento de los Números” – is risky and built on an unclear understanding of political representation.

A. The Latino Vote in 2004

In 1976, there were about 2 million Latino voters, or 2.4 percent of the electorate. By 2004, this had grown to 7.6 million voters and 6 percent of the electorate (see Table 1.5). While these estimates are based on self-reported Census data and may therefore overestimate the vote, it is clear that the number and share of Latino voters is increasing across the decades. In no year has the number of Latino reported voters or their share of the national vote decreased or remained static. Translating this growth into real power, and moving politicians away from the traditional ‘piñata politics’ and toward policy substance, is a continuing challenge for the Latino political community and one that was not resolved in the 2004 election. On the contrary, the nature of the 2004 election and its focus on a handful of battleground states – largely states with few Latinos – ceded influence to electorates in those states but provided little role for the growing Latino population.

** Insert Table 1.5 approximately here **

The self-reported voting levels in Table 1.5 indicate that Latino leaders did not achieve their goal of increasing the Latino electorate by two million voters between 2000 and 2004. The increase in the number of Latinos voting nationally was nevertheless larger (1.6 million) than in any previous quadrennial period and could have led to a more dramatic increase in the Latino

share of the vote. The non-Latino vote also increased more than in previous quadrennial periods, so the Latino share of the national vote only increased from 5.4 to 6.0 percent.

B. Latino Non-Voting

Despite the increase in the number of Latinos voting, the overall pattern of relatively low rates of registration and turnout among Latinos relative to whites and African Americans continued in 2004 (see Table 1.6). In 1980, Latinos were about seventeen percentage points less likely to be registered than Anglos and eight points less likely to be registered than African Americans. By 2004, these figures were about 16 percent and 10 percent, respectively. This suggests that registration gaps, relative to the size of the U.S. citizen population, are essentially unchanged over the last twenty-four years.

**** Insert Table 1.6 approximately here ****

Even larger voting gaps are visible, and Latinos are again the least likely of these three racial/ethnic groups to participate.⁹ In 1980, Latinos were nineteen percentage points less likely than Anglos to vote and eight points less likely than African Americans. By 2004, the respective gaps were eighteen points and thirteen points – in other words, relatively little change.

Because these data consist of U.S. citizen respondents over the age of 18, the differences cannot be explained by lower levels of U.S. citizenship in Latino communities. Youth explains some of the gap. Latinos are more likely to be in their twenties or thirties than are Anglos and African Americans. In addition to relative youth among adults, scholars have noted a variety of socio-economic factors that depress Latino turnout, particularly low levels of formal education and low household and individual incomes (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). While these dynamics are relevant to the participation of every group, Latinos are the most youthful group and have particularly low levels of education and income (DeSipio 1996). Table 1.7 illustrates

how these factors play a role in the participation of Latino, Anglo, and African-American citizens.

** Insert Table 1.7 approximately here **

For all groups, age is positively associated with voting. The one exception is the highest age category, as mobility and health problems can interfere with participation at this stage in life. This means that a relatively youthful group – such as Latinos – will be disadvantaged on election day. The data show that about 19 percent of Latino citizens are in the 18-24 age group, compared to 12 percent of Anglos and 16 percent of African Americans. Even within the same age groups, we see that Latinos are less likely to participate. For the youngest group, ages 18-24, only 33 percent of Latinos voted as compared to 47 percent of Anglos and 47 percent of African Americans. These patterns are consistent with those of previous elections.

A similar pattern applies to education and income. Latinos are more likely to occupy the lower categories, and individuals in such categories have the lowest turnout rates. For example, about 13 percent of Latinos have less than a ninth grade education, compared to 2.8 percent of Anglos and 4.4 percent of African Americans. Turnout is very low for this population: 37.2 percent for Latinos, 39.4 percent for Anglos, and 45.6 percent for African Americans. In terms of income, 18.2 percent of Latino U.S. citizen adults are in the lowest three categories, compared to 7.8 percent of Anglos and 23 percent of African Americans. The average turnout rate across these three categories is lowest for Hispanics, however – 33.6 percent compared with 49 percent for Anglos and 55.7 percent for African Americans.

Non-U.S. citizenship is a barrier that disproportionately disenfranchises Latinos (and Asian Americans). In 2004, 11.0 million of 27.1 million Latino adults were ineligible to participate electorally because of non-U.S. citizenship (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005).¹⁰

However, the effect of non-citizenship on the potential impact of Latino votes varies considerably by state (see Table 1.8). The state with the highest share of non-citizen adults is New Jersey. Almost 48 percent of the 906,000 Latino adults in this state were not citizens, which serves to counteract the relatively high (58.3 percent) level of voting by New Jersey Latino adult citizens. In the state of New Mexico, by contrast, only 10.7 percent of adults are not citizens, and the state has the highest voting percentage for both Latino adults and Latino adult citizens. This relatively high percentage of Latino citizens is long-standing and illustrates the importance of political context and history. Migration to New Mexico is relatively low and Anglos are a relatively small share of the population; these unique factors help to explain the significant political power possessed by the Hispanos of this state.

** Insert Table 1.8 approximately here **

The total number of ineligible Latino adults in some states is quite high – higher even than the total Latino population of many other states. For instance, there are 3.7 million non-citizen adults in California and 1.5 million in Texas. By contrast, there are only fifty-eight thousand non-citizen adults in New Mexico, although one might keep in mind that statewide and congressional elections in New Mexico can be very close, and even a few hundred or a few thousand votes in either direction have made a difference. In Florida, perhaps the most important battleground state in the union, there are almost a million Latino non-citizen adults, many of whom are not Cuban and therefore more likely to favor Democratic candidates if given the franchise.

Table 1.8 also shows the latent voting power of Latinos, a power that is unrealized because of low voter turnout among the eligible population. Across all the states, about half of Latino citizen adults turned out to vote. This ranged from 41.6 percent in Texas to 58.3 percent

in New Jersey. This means that almost 2.2 million eligible Latinos did not vote in Texas, and the corresponding figure in California was 2.4 million.

Of course, demographics and citizenship cannot tell the entire turnout story. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) found, civic skills and mobilization can bring individuals to the polls despite low SES. On the other hand, Latinos are not particularly likely to have occupations and affiliations that promote such skills, and Latinos are not often targeted by mobilization campaigns because of their reputation for relatively low turnout (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993, 2006; for a different conclusion based on recent Los Angeles County voting data, see Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004) – thereby helping to create a self-fulfilling prophecy of low participation. Certainly, these patterns can be overcome in elections that focus on Latino mobilization and where issues or candidates speak to Latino policy needs (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto 2005; Nuño 2007), but the 2004 presidential race does not appear to have met this standard.

Table 1.9 illustrates some reasons non-voters offer for not turning out on election day. Although these responses are not expressed in social-scientific language, they do provide important evidence for why so many Latinos do not make it to the polls. The first point to note is the large number of non-voters of all ethnicities and races. Almost 20 million Latinos, 52 million Anglos, and 11 million African Americans did not vote in 2004. The reasons for non-engagement vary by race and ethnicity, however. For Latinos, the most significant explanation was lack of U.S. citizenship, which was an obstacle for a much smaller percentage of the Anglo and African-American populations. Over half (56.5 percent) of Latinos provided this explanation, followed by 14.4 percent of African Americans and 6.3 percent of Anglos. While the latter two figures are larger than some might have anticipated – contrary to most media and

political discourse, immigration is not an entirely Latino phenomenon – the table points out the significant electoral obstacles posed by current immigration and naturalization laws.

**** Insert Table 1.9 approximately here ****

Aside from citizenship, the next most serious obstacle is the voter registration requirement. Over one-third of Latinos gave this as the reason they did not vote in 2004, while this was the reason for over two-thirds of Anglos and African Americans. This points out how voter registration requirements are obstacles to potential voters of all races and ethnicities, and a change in these laws might benefit millions (Keyssar 2000; Alvarez and Ansolabehere 2002).

In addition, another significant percentage of respondents indicated that they were in fact registered but simply did not vote. What are the reasons? While political scientists might note the effects of socio-economic status, individual respondents are unlikely to provide such explanations. Nevertheless, we find that the data reveal few significant differences by race and ethnicity. The most popular explanation is busyness and unspecified schedule conflicts, and the responses are in approximately the same range for all race/ethnic groups. Other commonly cited reasons include a lack of interest, illness or disability, being out of town, disinterest in the candidates or campaign issues, and problems with registration. While some sound like excuses – is it likely that almost ten percent of Anglos were out of town on Election Day – the registration problems are slightly more likely to affect Latinos, which could reflect a lack of knowledge of the political system.

C. The 2004 Latino Vote in the States with Large Latino Populations

For decades, Latino political activists have hoped that growing population numbers will translate into higher levels of political influence in Washington, D.C. and state capitals. These hopes are usually disappointed because parties and elected officials respond to voter preferences,

and sometimes only to those voters who are part of their winning coalitions. A large population alone is not enough to ensure substantive political representation.

To better understand the potential for Latino influence at the state level, Table 1.10 examines the change in the number of Latino voters in selected states from 2000 to 2004. A growing Latino electorate at least has the potential to increase its political influence, while a declining or static minority population is unlikely to attract the attention of elected officials.

** Insert Table 1.10 approximately here **

The first point to note is that the number of Latino voters increased by 27.9 percent over four years – from 5.9 million in 2000 to 7.6 million in 2004. However, because of the Electoral College system, overall votes matter much less than do state-level returns, as the public learned in the 2000 election. When we examine the state data, we see significant variation. While no state saw a decline in the Latino voter population, one state – a battleground state, at that – experienced single-digit growth (Colorado) while five states saw growth rates above thirty percent (California, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, and ‘other’). With the exception of some of the “other” states, none of these was one where we would have predicted a sizeable increase in Latino voting based on candidate and campaign outreach. Clearly, these growth rates do not map well with the states we identified as having competitive and non-competitive elections.

We can compare these growth rates to the data collected in the corresponding volume for the 1996 election (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999). From 1992 to 1996, the number of Latino voters increased by 16.3 percent – from 4.2 million to 4.9 million. In those years, one state saw its Latino electorate decline by 5.4 percent (Colorado) and only two states saw an increase of over thirty percent (New York and New Jersey). Vote growth was therefore much larger in terms of absolute numbers and relative percentages in the early 2000s than in the early 1990s.

In both time periods, the state with the fastest-growing Latino electorate was New Jersey (43.6 percent in 1992-96 and 54.7 percent in 2000-04). In addition, the state at the bottom end of the scale in both time periods was Colorado, although 2004 saw a positive change, which contrasts with the decline in the early 1990s. Some differences include the significant increase in the rate of growth in California (13.7 percent vs. 30.3 percent) and Arizona (4.8 percent vs. 19.8 percent). While Arizona has long been considered a “red” state, to use the overly simplistic categorizations of the journalistic and political worlds (see Fiorina 2004 for discussion), the Democrats have gained ground in large part due to the Latino population and California has become a safely Democratic states because of Latinos (Fraga, Ramírez, and Segura 2005). A Democratic “Southwest strategy” based on consolidating New Mexico and Colorado and winning Arizona and Nevada may be optimistic at the moment, but on the horizon.

In addition, another notable, but perhaps less electorally significant, change is the growth in the “other” category. This electorate grew by 18.3 percent from 1992 to 1996, but it increased by 27.9 percent in 2000-04. This likely reflects the increasingly dispersed Latino population across the “new destination” states (see Bejarano and Segura in this volume). With Latino populations and electorates increasing in states like North Carolina and Tennessee, many parts of America are experiencing for the first time a population hitherto largely concentrated in the southwest, Florida, and a few Northern and Midwestern urban areas. Some of this growth reflects new migrants and others are ‘internal migrants’ who are moving from established Latino metropolitan areas. While this population growth is large in terms of percentages, it is still small in terms of absolute numbers, so the electoral impact is likely to be minimal in the years to come. Nevertheless, the very presence of Latinos in these states may well change the political debate and certainly adds a new element to the traditional black-white racial paradigm.

D. Latino Partisanship and Candidate Choice

National Results

Despite relatively clear evidence of non-Cuban Latino loyalty to the Democratic Party, Republicans have long claimed Latinos as the lost tribe. Ronald Reagan famously stated that “Hispanics are Republicans, they just don’t know it yet” (Republican National Committee 2007). The Bush candidacies were premised, in part, on the assertion that Latinos were beginning to reconsider their allegiances (DeSipio and de la Garza 2005). Bush’s receipt of about 35 percent of the Latino vote in 2000, which equaled the previous high for Republicans – the 1984 contest between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale – gave many in the party high hopes for 2004. As we have suggested, the rhetoric of the 2004 campaign focused, in part, on a Latino electorate in flux that might result in further gains for the Republicans.

However, as demonstrated in Figure 1.11, non pattern of Latino partisan change is evident since the early 1960s. At first glance, there does appear to be a significant decline in Latino voting for Democratic candidates over the past four decades – from 85 percent in 1960 to approximately 56 to 62 percent in 2004. This, however, compares apples and oranges because of changes in the Latino population itself and in the ways pollsters sample Latinos. The surveys of the 1960s and 1970s only included Mexican Americans, while today’s surveys include a broader range of Latinos, including Republican-leaning Cuban Americans. As pollsters became more accurate in their sampling of Latinos (de la Garza 1987), samples moved beyond residents of urban neighborhoods and included suburban Latinos who were less liberal, therefore discovering that the political landscape looks different outside of urban Los Angeles and San Antonio. Polling the in the 1960s and 1970s showed Mexican American support for Democratic

presidential candidates in the 80 to 90 percent range. Once pollsters began to survey Latinos more accurately, this support 'dropped' to the 60 to 70 percent range.

** Insert Table 1.11 approximately here **

With these caveats in mind, there are no other clear patterns over time. While many are searching for a larger story, such as Latino movement toward the GOP, the data are resistant to such simplifications. Instead, Latino support is more like a narrowly bounded roller coaster, much like overall American public opinion. Candidates that are more popular with Anglos are more popular with Latinos, and vice versa. For example, Ronald Reagan may have received Latino support in the mid-30s in 1984, but this was not the start of a trend. Latino support for George H. W. Bush in 1988 fell to the low 30s, and support for Bob Dole in 1996 fell into the 20 percent range. Although Latino support for the GOP increased with George W. Bush at the top of the ticket in 2000 and 2004, this may well prove to be an exception that proves the rule rather than *Un Nuevo Dia* (Marbut 2005).

Initial results from the 2004 election seemed to indicate that President Bush had, indeed, made significant inroads among Latinos. The National Election Pool (NEP) gave Bush 44 percent of the vote. This suggested that the growing Latino population might not end up benefiting the Democratic Party. Subsequent analysis by Leal et al. (2005) and others suggests that this figure was too high. Two pieces of evidence were offered to challenge the NEP results for Latinos. First, multiple surveys with rigorous methodologies in the months leading up to the election generally found Kerry receiving twice the number of votes as Bush, and there was no reason to expect any significant change in the final days of the campaign. No specific events transpired that would have moved Latino voters to Bush, and Latino respondents across all demographic categories reported strong Kerry support. A possible exception was non-Catholic

Latinos (who were the target of Republican outreach, particularly in New Mexico), but a mid-October Washington Post/TRPI/Univision National Survey of Latino Voters showed this group reporting only slightly higher than average voter mobilization contacts. In addition, this group only constituted about 18 percent of the Latino electorate.

Second, voting data from Texas counties with a high percentage of Latinos showed Kerry with a comfortable lead over Bush. While NEP defended this number after the election, NBC would later revise the figure to 40 percent, and most analysts who follow the issue agree that 38-40 percent is a more realistic figure. This was also reminiscent of the situation in 2000, when exit pollsters initially claimed that Bush won 40 percent of the Latino vote but eventually adjusted this number to 35 percent. The quality of journalistic reporting on Latinos is so mixed so that newspaper articles can still be found that repeat the 44 percent figure.

State Results

Although we are cognizant of concerns about the accuracy of exit poll measures of Latino candidate choice, they offer the only available tool to assess state-by-state Latino voting patterns and thereby assess Latino influence in electoral outcomes. So, while we present state-level exit polls, we believe that these data should be interpreted with some caution and we note particular areas of concern below (see Table 1.12).

**** Insert Table 1.12 approximately here ****

The NEP state-level results show that John Kerry won the majority of Latinos in all states but Florida. Bush does not receive anywhere near a majority of the Hispanic vote in any other state. Kerry won comfortably in Illinois (76 percent), New York (75 percent), Colorado (68 percent), and California (63 percent). However, in Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas Kerry's

share of the vote did not exceed 60 percent, which is relatively low for a Democrat (see, also, Erikson, this volume).

Bush did best among Latinos in Florida, where he received 56 percent of the vote. This was most likely due to the predominantly-Republican Cuban American population, but it may also reflect the more general popularity of then-Governor Jeb Bush among many Latinos. This margin – like Kerry’s in Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas – is narrow for a Republican and demonstrates that Florida’s Latino community is rapidly diversifying.

Bush also did quite well in Texas, where he had served as governor before his presidential election. As state chief executive, Bush cultivated positive relationships with Tejanos and refused to campaign against immigrants or countenance those who did, such as Pete Wilson of California. This contrast won Bush Hispanic support in Texas during his gubernatorial campaigns and Kerry made little effort to campaign in the state. We are dubious, however, of the 49 percent NEP figure, in large part because Kerry earned a significantly higher share of the vote in high-concentration Latino areas of the state (Leal, Barreto, Lee, and de la Garza 2005). While the Latinos in such areas may well be more Democratic than Latinos who live around non-Latinos, a high share of Texas’ Latino population resides in these high-concentration areas. So, it would be difficult to see where the high number of Bush votes in the state could come from.

E. Latino Influence on the 2004 Presidential Race

The ability of Latino communities to shape a state’s Electoral College delegation is not simply a function of the share of votes for each candidate. Even a 90-10 margin for one candidate may mean little if Latino voters constitute only a small percent of the electorate or if the non-Latino electorate supports one of the candidates by a margin larger than the size of the

Latino electorate. The final column of Table 1.12 indicates the Latino share of the state vote. Again, we see a great deal of variation between the states. Of the nine states with significant Latino populations, the lowest percent was Illinois and Colorado (8 percent each) and the highest was New Mexico (32 percent). In the upper-middle range were California (21 percent) and Texas (20 percent), and in the lower-middle range were Florida (15 percent), Arizona (12 percent), New Jersey (10 percent), and New York (9 percent).

We assess two measures of possible Latino influence on the outcome of the 2004 presidential race (see, also, Erikson, this volume). First, we assess a baseline measure for Latino influence: what would have happened in the state races if no Latino had voted. Clearly, this is only a thought experiment. Latinos are integral to the body politic and are growing as an electorate, not shrinking or disappearing. The “no Latino voted” model, however is a minimum level of influence (or its absence). If the non-Latino electorate is sufficiently large and sufficiently cohesive, Latino votes simply don’t matter in presidential politics. In the thirty-six state-level races for presidential electors in the nine states with large Latino populations in the 1988 through 2000 elections, the results in twenty five would have been no different if no Latino voted (DeSipio and de la Garza 2005: 27-31). Second, we look at how important Latinos were to the winning candidate’s margin of victory. We therefore assess whether the outcome would have changed if Latinos did not vote for the candidate who won each state’s popular vote but continued to vote for the losing candidate at the levels estimated by the exit polls.

In previous analysis, we have used a third measure of influence: a change in the result of a presidential race in a state because either Latinos voted in higher numbers than would be expected based on normal quadrennial population growth or because Latinos voted more cohesively than would be expected based on the results of recent elections. We have found only

one example of this form of influence, the most rigorous, between 1988 and 2000 – Arizona in 1996. We did not find any examples in 2004.

As is evident in Tables 1.13 and 1.14, Latino votes made little difference in the allocation of these nine state’s Electoral College delegates. In three states – Illinois, New York, and Texas – the popular vote margin was larger than the entire Latino vote, meaning that it was impossible for Latino voters to make a difference (see Table 1.13). In all states, the net Latino vote for the winner did not provide the winning margin. While Bush won by only 6,988 votes in New Mexico, this margin was provided by non-Latinos. Fewer Latino votes would serve to increase the electoral competitiveness of some states, but probably not enough to turn any “blue” or “red” states into battleground states. For instance, without Latino voters in California, Kerry’s margin would have declined from about 1.2 million to about seven hundred thousand votes.

** Insert Table 1.13 approximately here **

The situation was different in 2000 because of the very close results in Florida and New Mexico and the fact that each state narrowly selected the candidate of choice of the majority of each state’s Latinos. In both states, the outcome would have changed without any Latino voters. Gore would have won Florida, Bush would have won New Mexico, and Gore would have won the presidency in the Electoral College. That this did not occur in 2004 does not mean that Latinos are becoming less influential but that Latino influence is contingent – as it almost always is – on the voting behavior of non-Latinos.

A significant share of the electorate may provide little political power for Latinos if non-Latinos are united behind another candidate. In Table 1.14, we assess what would have happened if Latinos had not supported the winning candidate. The first part shows the overall Bush and Kerry vote in each state and the Bush margin of victory (or loss) in terms of absolute

votes and percentages. The second part calculates the Latino vote for the winning candidates and then shows the winner's margin had no Latino voted for the winning candidate. The results show that three states might have switched had no Latino voted for the winning presidential candidate. Bush would have won California, and Kerry would have won Florida and New Mexico. In the other states, no change would have transpired. This suggests that in three states, the Latino votes received by the winning candidate were enough to make the difference. However, it is somewhat arbitrary to subtract Latino votes from the winner's total but not the loser's total.

** Insert Table 1.14 approximately here **

Conclusions

As was the case in several of the recent presidential election cycles analyzed in this series, the structure of the 2004 campaign did not work to the advantage of Latino outreach or Latino influence. Latinos were the target of outreach to the extent that they resided in competitive states. Thus, Latinos in Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada saw some attention in the primaries (less than we would have predicted) and Latinos in Colorado, New Mexico, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio were the target of candidate and party attentions in the general election.

The winner-take-all nature of awarding Electoral College votes largely eliminated any argument about Latino influence in these states, with the candidate of choice of the majority of Latino voters losing in all of these states but Florida and Pennsylvania (and there winning by well more than the number of Latino votes). As was the case in the 1988, 1996, and 2000 races, the vast majority of Latinos did not see or hear much (or any) outreach, whether Latino-targeted or not, and had little incentive to vote in the presidential race (or, in most cases, in state or local

racism). Latino-led outreach was largely absent and there was no comprehensive national strategy to move Latino permanent residents toward U.S. citizenship or non-voting Latino registered voters to the polls.

However, this familiar story of Latino influence (or lack thereof) is no longer adequate. The importance of Latinos goes beyond their simple contribution to winning coalitions in states. Their presence in the electorate now shapes some strategic decisions by both parties. To simply claim that Latinos were politically inconsequential in 2004 because their vote played no role in the election's outcome is to neglect the broad change in the importance of Latino voters and the more amorphous "Latino community" to national politics.

As we document here, the 2004 election presents a new role for Latinos in national elections, whether or not the competitiveness of state elections makes their votes count. First, as was the case in 2000, Latinos factored into both parties' calculations about victory in 2000. Second, the Latino electorate is more national than it has been at any time in the past. The Kerry campaign, for example, reached out to Pennsylvania and Ohio Latinos just as it did to their co-ethnics in New Mexico and Florida. With the dispersion of Latino migration over the past decade to parts of the country where Latinos did not previously reside, these states of new Latino electoral presence will only grow in future elections. Third, outreach – particularly Republican outreach – grew in sophistication in 2004. The adeptness of the Bush campaign in reaching specific subsets of Latinos was not new; Republican "Latino" campaigns have long had Cuban and non-Cuban components. What was new in 2004 was the very explicit and evidently successful effort to build a Latino outreach component into their outreach to religious conservatives. Future races will likely see similar parsing of Latino voters, at least in competitive states. With the steady growth of the Latino electorate, it is likely that all future

races will see candidate and campaign efforts to win pieces of the national Latino vote. Here, the Democrats can learn from the Republicans.

Finally, the potential of Latino voting and Latino influence is leading to national and state party calculations about the importance of nominating Latinos as candidates for statewide offices. Election to state office requires multi-racial coalitions to form because no state has a Latino electoral majority. The nomination of Secretary Martinez in the Florida U.S. Senate race made this connection explicit, but the desire to win Latino partisan loyalties adds an incentive for state party leaders to nominate Latino candidates who can build these coalitions. Thus, 2004 is a harbinger of a new arena for Latino politics, one that has the potential to add to the pool of candidates who can be considered to be of national stature in subsequent elections.

As we look to 2008, several questions arise both from the 2004 elections as well as from the national political dialogue since the election. First, we question the degree to which the new levels of Republican outreach to Latinos will continue in the absence of President Bush. As DeSipio and de la Garza (2005) noted, Bush altered the rhetoric of the Republican Party toward Latinos, at least in national elections, and the data we present here demonstrates that he won some new Latino votes as a result. Thus, we can not be sure whether the changes we have identified are party-driven (and more permanent) or candidate specific (and more fragile).

Second, and relatedly, both the 2000 and 2004 races saw less incendiary rhetoric around issues of concern to Latinos, particularly immigration, immigrant incorporation, and bilingual education. However, in light of the immigration reform debate that followed the 2004 race and the passage of Proposition 200 in Arizona, this *détente* may disappear in 2008.

Third, 2008 offers a new form of Latino leadership. In addition to the three Latino members of the U.S. Senate, the elected leadership of Latino communities includes others with a

national presence, such as New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (a 2008 presidential candidate) and Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. Never before have there been so many Latino leaders elected by multi-racial electorates. These officeholders, as well as leaders from other sectors of U.S. society, could change the pattern we have documented in this series of Latinos not taking the lead in overcoming the barriers to Latino electoral influence.

Finally, 2006 saw an unprecedented outpouring of Latino demand making in the demonstrations against H.R. 4437 and for immigration reform. At this writing, the hopes of these several million peaceful protestors have been dashed. Their hopes and anger could serve as the foundation for equally unprecedented levels of naturalization and voting, if not in 2008 then in the elections that follow – particularly if national leaders are unable to reach a compromise that ensures a path to legalization for unauthorized immigrants in the United States.

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Endnotes

Table 1.1 Latino Electoral College Delegates, by Party, 1992-2004

	1992		1996		2000		2004	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Latino	21 (5.7%)	8 (4.8%)	24 (6.3%)	6 (3.8%)	24 (9.0%)	13 (5.0%)	15 (6.0%)	10 (3.5%)
Non-Latino	349	160	355	153	243	258	234	276
Total	370	168	379	159	267	271	252	286

Note: Latino surname lists underestimate the true Latino population by approximately 20 percent.

Source: Authors' calculations using standard sources of Latino surnames.

Table 1.2 The Single Most Important Issue in Your Vote for President, 2004

Issue	October 2004
Economy	26.7
Terror	20.2
Iraq	15.2
Education	15.2
Health	11.1
Immigration	3.5
Crime	1.3
Other	3
Don't Know	3.9

Source: Question 15 of the Washington Post/Univision/TRPI October Election “Survey of Registered Latino Voters in the 2004 Elections.”

Table 1.3 Campaign Fundraising, 1995-06, 1999-2000, 2003-2004

	1995-1996	1999-2000	2003-2004	% Change 1996-2000	% Change 2000-2004	% Change 1996-2004
Incumbents						
Average For:						
Latino incumbents	\$368,758	\$762,881	\$853,103	+106.8	11.8	131.3
Latino incumbents facing major party opponents	\$339,215	\$1,057,283	\$941,508	+211.7	-11.0	177.6
All incumbents	\$725,677	\$900,026	\$1,130,426	+24	25.6	55.8
General Election						
Challengers to Incumbents						
Average for:						
Major party challengers to Latino incumbents (all ethnicities)	\$57,143	\$108,688	\$85,043	+90.2	-21.8	48.8
Latino challengers to Latino incumbents	\$28,026	\$135,848	\$227,788	+384.7	67.7	712.8
Latino challengers to non-Latino incumbents	NA	\$364,944	\$226,910	--	-37.8	--
All challengers to incumbents	\$262,813	\$364,944	\$267,253	+38.9	-26.8	1.7
General Election to Open Seats						
Average for:						
Latino candidates	\$480,545	\$78,017	\$752,573	-83.8	864.6	56.6
All Candidates	\$640,000	\$1,080,944	\$1,204,340	+68.9	11.4	88.2

Note: In 2000, one Latino incumbent (California's Matthew Martinez) lost in a party primary and, consequently, did not run the general election. If he is excluded from the average, the amount raised by Latino incumbents rises to \$794,521. In 2003-2004, nominees for both parties who were incumbents due to redistricting contested two Texas races. For the calculations in Table 1.13, both candidates in these races were coded as incumbents rather than challengers or open seats.

Sources: 1995-1996 data from de la Garza and DeSipio (1999: table 1.5); 1999-2000 data from de la Garza and DeSipio (2004: table 1.11); 2003-2004: authors' calculations of Federal Election Commission data available at <http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea.shtml> (accessed May 13, 2007) and Barone, Michael and Richard E. Cohen. 2005. *The Almanac of American Politics, 2006*. USA: National Journal Group.

Table 1.4 National Overview, United States 2004

Total U.S. Population ^a	285,691,501
Total Latino Population ^a	40,459,196
% Latino of total U.S. population ^a	14.2%
% Mexican American of Latino population ^a	64.0%
% Puerto Rican of Latino population ^a	9.6%
% Cuban American of Latino population ^a	3.6%
% Other Hispanic of Latino population ^a	22.9%
Voting age population (VAP) ^b	215,694,000
Latino VAP ^b	27,129,000
% Latino of VAP ^b	12.6%
Citizen VAP	197,006,000
Latino Citizen VAP	16,088,000
% Latino Citizen VAP	8.2%
Latino adult non-citizens ^b	11,041,000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

^a Based on the 2004 American Community Survey.

^b Based on Current Population Study (2004, Table 2, White alone and Hispanic)

Table 1.5 The Latino Vote as a Percentage of the Total Vote, 1976-2004^a

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
Total vote	86,698,000	93,066,000	101,878,000	102,224,000	113,866,000	105,017,000	110,836,000	125,736,000
Latino vote ^b	2,098,000	2,453,000	3,092,000	3,710,000	4,238,000	4,928,000	5,934,000	7,587,000
Latino percentage of the total vote ^c	2.4%	2.6%	3.0%	3.6%	3.7%	4.7%	5.4%	6.0%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1978, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2006)

Notes: ^aVoting estimates rounded to the nearest thousand.

^bLatinos can be of any race.

^cBased on Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates. CPS data may overestimate actual voting levels by as much as 20 percent. However, there is no evidence that different national origin groups misreport voting at different rates (Census 1990c)

Table 1.6 Voting and Registration Rates for White, Black, and Latino U.S. Citizens: 1980-2004

	White	Black	Latino
% registered (citizens)			
1980	70.8	61.7	53.3
1984	72.1	68.6	58.9
1988	71.1	67.0	56.6
1992	74.0	67.2	58.5
1996	72.0	66.4	58.6
2000	71.6	67.6	57.3
2004	73.6	68.7	57.9
% voting (citizens)			
1980	63.1	52.0	44.1
1984	64.0	57.8	48.0
1988	61.9	53.5	45.9
1992	67.1	56.9	48.2
1996	59.5	53.0	44.0
2000	61.7	56.9	45.1
2004	65.4	60.0	47.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2006). Unless otherwise noted, all calculations of the citizen population are the authors'.

Notes: See notes on Table 1.5.

Table 1.7. Turnout Rates and share of Adult Citizen Population for Age, Education, and Income Cohorts of Latinos, Non-Latino Whites, and Non-Latino Blacks, 2000

	Latino Adult		Non-Hispanic White Adult		Non-Hispanic Black Adult	
	Turnout Rate	Population Share	Turnout Rate	Population Share	Turnout Rate	Population Share
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Age</i>						
18-24	33.0%	(18.9%)	47.5%	(12.0%)	47.1%	(15.8%)
25-44	45.2%	(43.3%)	61.5%	(35.2%)	59.3%	(40.5%)
45-64	56.2%	(27.0%)	72.0%	(34.6%)	65.3%	(31.6%)
65-74	57.9%	(6.6%)	74.4%	(9.4%)	68.6%	(7.1%)
75+	55.7%	(4.2%)	69.9%	(8.7%)	61.9%	(5.0%)
<i>Education</i>						
LT 9 years	37.2%	(12.5%)	39.4%	(2.8%)	45.6%	(4.4%)
9-12 yrs., no diploma	30.5%	(15.7%)	40.6%	(7.6%)	45.3%	(15.2%)
H.S. grad.	42.7%	(32.0%)	58.3%	(32.4%)	56.3%	(35.3%)
Some College	56.1%	(27.1%)	71.7%	(28.8%)	66.7%	(29.7%)
BA or Equiv.	66.5%	(9.2%)	80.7%	(18.9%)	72.6%	(10.8%)
Advanced Degree	78.1%	(3.6%)	86.6%	(9.5%)	78.7%	(4.5%)
<i>Family Income (per year)</i>						
Less than \$10,000	34.6%	(6.0%)	39.4%	(2.4%)	50.6%	(10.6%)
\$10,000 - \$14,999	35.2%	(6.1%)	50.2%	(2.8%)	55.0%	(7.0%)
\$15,000 - \$19,999	42.2%	(6.1%)	57.3%	(2.6%)	61.5%	(5.4%)
\$20,000 - \$29,999	45.8%	(13.0%)	60.5%	(8.1%)	61.2%	(12.3%)
\$30,000 - \$39,999	45.2%	(13.7%)	64.9%	(9.7%)	67.5%	(11.0%)
\$40,000 - \$49,999	47.4%	(9.1%)	72.4%	(8.3%)	66.8%	(7.3%)
\$50,000 - \$74,999	59.8%	(17.7%)	74.6%	(20.2%)	73.6%	(15.1%)
\$75,000 - \$99,999	66.2%	(7.8%)	80.1%	(12.9%)	77.2%	(6.9%)
\$100,000 - 149,999	67.7%	(5.0%)	83.5%	(10.8%)	76.3%	(4.9%)
\$150,000 and over	70.7%	(2.0%)	83.7%	(6.8%)	79.3%	(1.9%)
Not reported	34.7%	(13.7%)	55.6%	(15.4%)	42.7%	(17.5%)

Note: The figure in parentheses is the share of the adult citizen population made up of that age, education, or income cohort.

Source: Author's compilations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006: tables 2, 6, 9).

Table 1.8. Latino Turnout and Noncitizenship by State, 2004

State	All Latino Adults	All Latino Adult Citizens	Adult Latinos Who Voted	% of Adult Latinos Voting	% of Adult Latino Citizens Voting	Number of Noncitizen Adults	% of Noncitizen Adults
Arizona	1,160,000	629,000	296,000	25.5%	47.1%	531,000	45.8%
California	8,127,000	4,433,000	2,081,000	25.6%	46.9%	3,694,000	45.5%
Colorado	574,000	361,000	165,000	28.7%	45.7%	213,000	37.1%
Florida	2,422,000	1,444,000	824,000	34.0%	57.1%	978,000	40.4%
Illinois	1,031,000	608,000	294,000	28.5%	48.4%	423,000	41.0%
New Jersey	906,000	475,000	277,000	30.6%	58.3%	431,000	47.6%
New Mexico	544,000	486,000	276,000	50.7%	56.8%	58,000	10.7%
New York	1,976,000	1,346,000	613,000	31.0%	45.5%	630,000	31.9%
Texas	5,232,000	3,688,000	1,533,000	29.3%	41.6%	1,544,000	29.5%

Source: Author's compilations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006: table 4a)

Table 1.9 Reasons for Not Voting, by Race and Ethnicity, 2004

	Latino	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic Black
	19,542,000	51,844,000	10,894,000
Total Nonvoters	%	%	%
Not a U.S. citizen	56.5%	6.3%	14.4%
U.S. citizen, not registered	34.7%	71.1%	67.1%
Registered, did not vote	8.8%	22.7%	18.5%
<u>Reasons Registered Voters Report That They Did Not Vote</u>			
Too busy, conflicting schedule	23.5	18.9	20.7
Not interested	10.5	10.8	10.0
Illness or disability	10.7	16.2	16.5
Did not like candidates or campaign issues	7.3	11.1	6.4
Out of town	6.3	9.9	5.5
Forgot to vote	6.1	3.0	3.9
Transportation problems	1.6	1.9	4.2
Inconvenient polling place	1.5	3.2	2.6
Registration problems	10.9	6.2	7.2
Bad weather conditions	0.2	0.5	0.3
Other reason	11.6	10.8	9.8
Don't know or refused	9.8	7.6	13.0

Source: Authors' compilation based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (2004: tables 2, 12).

Table 1.10 Latino Vote, 2000 and 2004, National and Selected States

	2000 Vote	2004 Vote	Change (%)
Arizona	247,000	296,000	19.8%
California	1,597,000	2,081,000	30.3%
Colorado	158,000	165,000	4.4%
Florida	678,000	824,000	21.5%
Illinois	218,000	294,000	34.9%
New Jersey	179,000	277,000	54.7%
New Mexico	191,000	276,000	44.5%
New York	502,000	613,000	22.1%
Texas	1,300,000	1,533,000	17.9%
Other	864,000	1,228,000	42.1%
Total	5,934,000	7,587,000	27.9%

Note: Current Population Survey data are collected monthly through a household survey of approximately 50,000 households and rely on self-reporting of voting and voter eligibility in the weeks after the election. These data likely overestimate actual voting levels, perhaps by a significant amount.

Sources: Author's calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002: table 4a, 2006: table 4a).

Table 1.11 National Latino Voting Patterns, 1960-2004

Year	Democratic Vote (%)	Republican Vote (%)	Other Vote (%)
Latino Electorate	(%)	(%)	(%)
1960			
Mexican Americans ^a	85	15	--
1964			
Mexican Americans ^a	90	10	--
1968			
Mexican Americans ^a	87	10	--
1972			
Mexican Americans ^a	64	36	--
Mexican Americans ^b	85	15	--
1976			
Mexican Americans ^b	92	8	--
Latinos ^c	82	18	--
1980			
Latinos ^c	56	37	7
1984			
Latinos (CBS) ^d	66	34	--
Latinos (NBC) ^e	68	32	--
Latinos (ABC) ^e	56	44	--
1988			
Latinos (CBS) ^d	70	30	--
Latinos (ABC) ^f	70	30	--
Latinos (NBC) ^f	69	31	--
Latinos (<i>LA Times</i>) ^f	62	38	--
1992			
Latinos (VRS) ^g	62	24	14
Latinos (<i>LA Times</i>) ^h	53	31	16
1996			
Latinos ^g	72	21	6
2000			
ABC ⁱ	62	35	--
CBS ⁱ	66	29	--
CNN ^j	62	34	3
<i>Los Angeles Times</i> ⁱ	61	38	1
<i>New York Times</i> ⁱ	67	31	2
<i>USA Today</i> ⁱ	64	32	2
2004			
NEP (CNN-Initial) ^j	53	44	2
NBC NEP (Revised) ^k	58	40	
WCVI (Revised)	64	35	

Note: Adapted from DeSipio (1996a), Table 2.1 and Desipio and de la Garza (2005).
Sources:

^a Garcia and de la Garza (1977, 101-103).

^b Gann and Duignan (1986, 210).

^c CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll in “Opinion Roundup” (1989, 24).

^d CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll in “Opinion Roundup” (1989, 25).

^e Balz (1987, 32).

^f “Opinion Roundup” (1986, 26).

^g Voter Research and Surveys exit poll (most of the networks and wire services used this exit poll in 1992 and 1996).

^h *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 1992.

ⁱ Relies on data collected by the Voter News Service Consortium. Each news agency, however, develops its own analysis methodology and weighting. Other vote includes percentage of votes for Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan.

^j <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/index.epolls.html>

ABC, AP, CBS, CNN, Foxnews, and NBC were part of the National Election Pool (NEP) and used exit polls from Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International. The NEP data reported in Table 1.10 was obtained from CNN

(<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html>).

^k Revised NBC (<http://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/stories/2004/11/29/daily42.html>)

Table 1.12 Exit Polls of Latino Presidential Candidate Choice (%)

	Kerry	Bush	Nader	Latino Share
Latinos Nationally				
NEP	53	44	2	8
NEP (NBC Revised)	58	40		
Los Angeles Times	54	45		5
WCVI Exit Poll	65	33	2	NR
WCVI Exit Poll (Revised)	64	35		
Latinos by State				
Arizona				
NEP	56	43		12
California				
NEP	63	32		21
Colorado				
NEP	68	30	--	8
Florida				
NEP	44	56	--	15
Illinois				
NEP	76	23		8
New Jersey				
NEP	56	43	1	10
New Mexico				
NEP	56	44	1	32
New York				
NEP	75	24	1	9
Texas				
NEP	50	49		20

Notes: ABC, AP, CBS, CNN, Foxnews, and NBC were part of the National Election Pool (NEP) and used exit polls from Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International. The NEP data reported in Table 1.10 were found at the CNN website. The *Los*

Angeles Times California Exit Poll data were found at
<http://www.latimes.com/media/acrobat/2004-12/15267247.pdf>.
WCVI: William C. Valasquez Institute.

Table 1.13 Latino Influence on Award of Electoral College Votes

State	Electoral Winner	Popular Vote Margin	Latino Vote	Estimated Latino Vote for Winner	Estimated Latino Vote for Loser	Net Latino Vote for Winner	Result Had Latino Vote
2000							
Arizona	Bush	96,311	247,000	81,510	165,490	-83,980	No change
California	Gore	1,293,774	1,597,000	1,117,900	479,100	+638,800	No change
Colorado	Bush	145,521	158,000	38,710	119,290	-80,580	No change
Florida	Bush	537	678,000	335,610	342,390	-6,780	Gore wins s
Illinois	Gore	569,605	218,000	NA	NA	NA	No change
New Jersey	Gore	504,677	179,000	102,030	76,970	+25,060	No change
New Mexico	Gore	366	191,000	126,060	64,940	+61,120	Bush wins s
New York	Gore	1,704,323	502,000	404,110	97,890	+306,220	No change
Texas	Bush	1,365,893	1,300,000	539,500	760,500	-221,000	No change
2004							
Arizona	Bush	210,770	296,000	127,280	168,720	-41,440	No Change
California	Kerry	1,235,659	2,081,000	1,311,030	769,970	+541,060	No Change
Colorado	Bush	99,523	165,000	49,500	115,500	-66,000	No Change
Florida	Bush	380,878	824,000	461,440	362,560	+98,880	No Change
Illinois	Kerry	545,604	294,000	223,440	70,560	+152,880	No Change
New Jersey	Kerry	241,427	277,000	154,560	122,440	+32,120	No Change
New Mexico	Bush	5,988	276,000	121,440	154,560	-33,120	No Change
New York	Kerry	1,351,713	613,000	459,750	153,250	+306,500	No Change
Texas	Bush	1,694,213	1,533,000	751,170	781,830	-30,660	No Change

Notes: “Estimated Latino Vote for Winner” is calculated by multiplying major state exit poll data for the state’s winning candidate.

Sources: Exit polls: authors’ compilations based on published sources; turnout data: authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002: Table 4a, 2006: Table 4a).

Table 1.14 Latino Influence and the 2004 Elections*Margin Between Bush and Kerry, Selected States*

<u>State</u>	<u>Bush Vote</u>	<u>Kerry Vote</u>	<u>Bush Margin of Victory^a</u>	<u>Absolute Difference As % of State Vote</u>
Arizona	1,104,294	893,524	210,770	10.6% ^b
California	5,509,826	6,745,485	-1,235,659	10.1%
Colorado	1,101,255	1,001,732	99,523	4.7%
Florida	3,964,522	3,583,544	380,978	5.0%
Illinois	2,345,946	2,891,550	-545,604	10.4%
New Jersey	1,670,003	1,911,430	-241,427	6.7%
New Mexico	376,930	370,942	5,988	0.8%
New York	2,962,567	4,314,280	-1,351,713	18.6%
Texas	4,526,917	2,832,704	1,694,213	23.0%

Latino Votes As a Share of the Winning Margin, Selected States

<u>State</u>	<u>Winning Candidate</u>	<u>Latino Vote for Winning Candidate</u>	<u>Winner's Margin Had No Latino Voted for Winner</u>	<u>Impact</u>
Arizona	Bush	127,280	83,490	No change
California	Kerry	1,311,030	-75,371	Bush wins state
Colorado	Bush	49,500	50,023	No change
Florida	Bush	461,440	-80,462	Kerry wins state
Illinois	Kerry	223,440	322,164	No Change
New Jersey	Kerry	155,120	86,307	No Change
New Mexico	Bush	121,440	-115,452	Kerry wins state
New York	Kerry	459,750	891,963	No Change
Texas	Bush	751,170	943,043	No Change

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006: Table 4); exit polls from the National Election Pool (NEP), Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International.

Notes: ^aFor ease of presentation, we represent the margin as the Bush vote minus the Kerry vote. Thus, a plus represents a Bush victory and a minus a Kerry victory.

^bThese Latino vote totals for the winning candidates are derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey Data, which overestimate turnout and from exit polls.

¹ Forthcoming in *Beyond the Barrio: Latinos and the 2004 Election*, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Louis DeSipio, and David Leal, eds. 2009. Norte Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

² We use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to refer to individuals who trace their origin or ancestry to the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America and the Caribbean.

³ We accept the assessment of Leal, Barreto, Lee, and de la Garza (2005) that Bush likely received 39-40 percent of the Latino vote.

⁴ In the interests of intellectual disclosure, it should be noted that the editors of this volume participated in the design of the survey discussed in this article.

⁵ A complete inventory of 2004 Spanish-language campaign advertising through September 2004 can be found in Segal 2004b.

⁶ See, for example, National Hispanic Agenda '88.

⁷ A third new member – California's Jim Costa – was elected in 2004 and is counted by some as a Latino member of Congress. Costa represents a Latino-majority district in the Central Valley. Costa is of Portuguese-Azorean ancestry and is not Latino by the definition used here. It should be noted that Costa, along with Californian Dennis Cardoza, are members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. Devin Nunes, also from California, is a member of the Congressional Hispanic Conference. Like Costa, Cardoza and Nunes are of Portuguese-Azorean ancestry.

⁸ Salazar is pro-choice and opposed a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. He also opposes gun control.

⁹ Asian Americans are somewhat less likely than Latinos to register or vote. This gap widens in multivariate models that account for socioeconomic status. These models would predict that Asian Americans would vote at higher rates than Latinos.

¹⁰ Many in this population can be moved relatively quickly into voting eligibility. Of the 11 million non-naturalized immigrants, approximately 5.1 million are legal permanent residents currently eligible to naturalize (Passell 2007). It is this group of naturalization-eligible Latino adults that a rigorous Latino outreach effort might target in the years before a competitive election. Future immigration reforms may qualify some of the remaining 6 million Latino adults to legalize and later naturalize, but in 2004 (and 2008, for that matter), they are excluded from participation.